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ABSTRACT
How can price elasticities be identified when agents face optimization frictions such as adjustment
costs or inattention? I derive bounds on structural price elasticities that are a function of the observed
effect of a price change on demand, the size of the price change, and the degree of frictions. The degree
of frictions is measured by the utility losses agents tolerate to deviate from the frictionless optimum.
The bounds imply that frictions affect intensive margin elasticities much more than extensive margin
elasticities. I apply these bounds to the literature on labor supply. The utility costs of ignoring the tax
changes used to identify intensive margin labor supply elasticities are typically less than 1% of earnings.
As a result, small frictions can explain the differences between micro and macro elasticities, extensive
and intensive margin elasticities, and other disparate findings. Pooling estimates from existing studies,
I estimate a Hicksian labor supply elasticity of 0.33 on the intensive margin and 0.25 on the extensive
margin after accounting for frictions.
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The identi￿cation of structural parameters of stylized models is one of the central tasks of
applied economics. Unfortunately, most models omit various frictions that make agents
deviate systematically from their theoretical predictions. For instance, canonical models of
labor supply or consumption behavior do not permit adjustment costs, inattentive agents,
or status quo biases. How can structural parameters be identi￿ed when agents face such
optimization frictions?
One natural solution is to estimate the structural parameters of a model that incorporates
the frictions. This approach has two limitations in practice. First, it is di¢ cult to incorporate
all frictions in a tractable model. Second, estimating even simple dynamic models with fric-
tions, such as Ss adjustment, requires strong assumptions and is computationally challenging
(Attanasio 2000). Motivated by these limitations, I propose an alternative solution: bounding
structural preference parameters without identifying how frictions a⁄ect behavior.
I analyze a standard dynamic lifecycle model in which the e⁄ect of income-compensated
(Hicksian) price changes on demand is determined by a structural parameter of utility ". I
introduce optimization frictions into this nominal model through an error term in the demand
function whose conditional expectation is unknown. These optimization errors generate dif-
ferences between mean observed demand and the mean optimal demand predicted by the
frictionless model. Because the optimization errors need not be orthogonal to the price, the
observed Hicksian elasticity b " estimated from demand responses to a price change di⁄ers from
the structural elasticity parameter ". The observed elasticity b " confounds preferences (") with
the e⁄ect of the frictions. For example, agents may under-react to a price increase in the
short-run because of adjustment costs.
This paper seeks to identify " from estimates of b ". I focus on identifying " because it is
important for both positive and normative analysis. The impacts of prices in steady-state are
determined purely by " in many models. Moreover, the recovery of preference parameters is
essential for welfare analysis.
I bound " from observations of b " by assuming that agents choose points near the friction-
less optimum. Speci￿cally, I allow agents to deviate arbitrarily from the nominal model￿ s
prediction as long as the expected lifetime utility cost of doing so is less than ￿ percent of
1expenditure. This property is satis￿ed by standard dynamic adjustment cost models, where
agents remain on average within some utility threshold of their optimum. In the case of other
frictions such as inattention or status quo biases, this restriction requires that agents respond
to incentives that are su¢ ciently important.
I derive a closed-form representation for bounds on the structural Hicksian elasticity " as a
function of the observed Hicksian elasticity b ", the size of the price change used for identi￿cation
￿logp, and the degree of frictions ￿.1 The bounds shed light on what can be learned from
reduced-form elasticity estimates in an environment with frictions. The bounds shrink at a
quadratic rate with ￿logp. As a result, pooling several small price changes ￿although useful
in improving statistical precision ￿yields less information about the structural elasticity than
studying a few large price changes. If b " > 0, the lower bound on the structural elasticity " is
strictly positive, showing that frictions do not a⁄ect tests of a null hypothesis of zero response.
If the observed elasticity b " = 0, the upper bound on " can be expressed in terms of the utility
cost of ignoring the price change. This permits straightforward calculations of the range of
elasticities consistent with zero behavioral response, analogous to power calculations used to
evaluate statistical precision.
The preceding results apply to an intensive margin model in which consumption is perfectly
divisible. I also derive bounds on extensive margin elasticities by analyzing a model in which
agents choose whether to buy an indivisible good. The bounds on the structural extensive
margin elasticity (￿) shrink linearly with ￿ and are therefore an order of magnitude tighter
than those on the Hicksian intensive margin elasticity ("). The bounds are tighter because the
utility costs of ignoring price changes are ￿rst-order on the extensive margin, in contrast with
the second-order costs on the intensive margin. Hence, frictions such as adjustment costs or
inattention have smaller e⁄ects on aggregate demand when microeconomic choices are discrete
rather than continuous.
One can obtain tighter bounds on " or ￿ by calculating the least upper bound and the largest
lower bound implied by multiple observed elasticities. The sensitivity of structural elasticity
estimates to frictions can be evaluated by computing these uni￿ed bounds as a function of
￿. The smallest level of frictions ￿min that reconciles a group of observed elasticities provides
1The value of ￿ must be speci￿ed exogenously and may vary across applications. I consider the assumption
that aggregate welfare would be 1% higher absent frictions (￿ = 1%) to be a plausible benchmark.
2measures the ￿economic signi￿cance￿ of the di⁄erences in estimates. If ￿min is small, the
di⁄erences are not economically signi￿cant in that they can be explained simply by allowing for
small frictions. The value of " or ￿ when ￿ = ￿min converges to the true value as the number of
observed elasticities grows large, providing a point estimate of the structural elasticity adjusted
for frictions.
I apply these methods to investigate what can be learned about structural labor supply
elasticities from the empirical literature on labor supply. The application consists of four
components, each of which addresses a di⁄erent strand of the labor supply literature.
First, I analyze the impact of frictions on the intensive margin elasticity ￿the e⁄ects of tax
changes on hours of work for employed individuals. Based on a large body of microeconometric
evidence, ￿the profession has settled on a value for this elasticity close to zero￿(Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz 2011). I show that small frictions could explain why observed elasticities are
often near zero by calculating the utility costs of ignoring tax reforms. For instance, the
utility costs of ignoring the widely studied Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) ￿and instead
choosing the optimal pre-reform level of work hours ￿are less than 2% of income per year
for all except top income earners. Accordingly, empirical studies ￿nd that TRA86 induced
behavioral responses in the short run only for top income earners. To assess what can be
learned about " from existing estimates of intensive margin labor supply elasticities, I calculate
bounds on " using estimates from studies of hours elasticities, taxable income elasticities,
elasticities for top income earners, and macroeconomic cross-country estimates. Even though
the observed elasticity estimates vary widely, all the estimates are consistent with a single
structural elasticity " if one permits frictions of 1% of post-tax earnings in choosing labor
supply. Pooling the ￿fteen hours and taxable income elasticity estimates yields bounds on "
of (0:28;0:54) when ￿ = 1%, with a 95% con￿dence interval of (0:23;0:61). The minimum
level of frictions required to reconcile these ￿fteen estimates is ￿min = 0:5% of net earnings
and the corresponding point estimate of the structural Hicksian elasticity is "￿-min = 0:33.
Second, I analyze how frictions a⁄ect extensive margin elasticities ￿ the e⁄ects of tax
changes on employment rates. The utility costs of ignoring tax changes on the extensive
margin are between 5 to 10% of income for many tax policy changes in the U.S. These
large costs could explain why microeconometric studies uniformly detect signi￿cant impacts
of tax changes on employment rates despite ￿nding negligible intensive margin responses.
3This result challenges the prevailing consensus that extensive margin elasticities are much
larger than intensive margin elasticities. Instead, current empirical methods may simply be
better suited to detecting responses on the extensive margin than the intensive margin in the
presence of frictions. I calculate bounds on the structural extensive margin elasticity ￿ using
estimates from existing studies. The bounds on the extensive margin elasticities implied by
each study are very tight, con￿rming that observed elasticities provide accurate estimates of
structural elasticities on the extensive margin. The mean extensive margin elasticity among
the microeconometric studies I consider is 0:25.
Third, I turn to the literature on non-linear budget set estimation, which analyzes the
impacts of progressive income taxation on labor supply. One well known issue in ￿tting such
models is that much fewer individuals bunch at kink points of the tax system than one would
predict in a frictionless model (Saez 2010). I show that the utility gains from bunching at kinks
are very small, typically less than 1% of consumption. Allowing for optimization frictions in
NLBS models can explain the lack of bunching at most kinks and provide a more disciplined
error structure for such models.
Finally, I assess whether frictions can explain the discrepancy between micro and macro es-
timates of Hicksian (steady-state) and Frisch (intertemporal substitution) elasticities. Macro
estimates of the Hicksian elasticity, which are based on cross-country comparisons, are larger
than micro estimates. Frictions and indivisible labor (Rogerson 1988, Rogerson and Walle-
nius 2009) fully account for this gap. On the intensive margin, the micro estimate of " = 0:33
after accounting for frictions matches cross-country evidence. On the extensive margin, mi-
cro estimates match macro cross-country estimates even without accounting for frictions, as
expected given the results above. Macro estimates of the Frisch elasticity, which are based on
￿ uctuations in labor supply over the business cycle, are also larger than micro estimates of the
Frisch elasticity. To assess whether this discrepancy can be explained by frictions, I bound the
structural intensive margin Frisch elasticity using the estimated structural Hicksian elasticity.
The bound on the intensive Frisch elasticity is consistent with macro evidence on ￿ uctuations
in hours conditional on employment over the business cycle. However, micro estimates are not
consistent with macro evidence on the extensive margin intertemporal subsitution elasticity, as
shown in Chetty et al. (2011b). I conclude that frictions explain the gap between micro and
macro estimates of steady-state elasticities relevant for cross-country comparisons, but can-
4not reconcile the di⁄erences between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution
elasticities relevant for business cycles.
The analysis here should be viewed as one step toward characterizing how frictions a⁄ect
labor supply elasticities. The results are based on a standard lifecycle model of labor supply
as in MaCurdy (1981) and do not account for factors incorporated into more recent models,
such as human capital accumulation, credit constraints, or uncertainty. One would have
to specify a nominal model that incorporates all of these structural features to bound labor
supply elasticities in such an environment. This point illustrates a more general caveat: the
ability to account for frictions using bounds does not provide an excuse for failing to build an
accurate model. The bounds are valid only if the nominal model is correct up to optimization
frictions.
This paper builds upon and relates to the partial identi￿cation, near rationality, robust
control, and durable goods literatures. The econometric literature on partial or set identi￿-
cation addresses problems such as missing data or imperfect instruments (Manski 2007, Nevo
and Rosen 2008). The present paper uses set identi￿cation to estimate structural parameters
with model mis-speci￿cation. I derive bounds by assuming that agents are ￿near rational,￿as
in the menu cost and near rationality literature in macroeconomics (Akerlof and Yellen 1985,
Mankiw 1985, Cochrane 1989). The focus on a class of models around a pre-speci￿ed nominal
model parallels the robust control literature (Hansen and Sargent 2007). The robust control
literature analyzes optimal policy with a minimax criterion and model uncertainty, whereas
I consider identi￿cation of the nominal model￿ s parameters in the same setting. Finally,
the bounds provide an alternative method of estimating preferences or production functions
in models with adjustment costs. This approach requires fewer assumptions than existing
methods of identifying such models (e.g. Eberly 1994, Attanasio 2000) because it uses inputs
that can be estimated using quasi-experimental techniques. However, it does not permit as
rich an analysis of short-run counterfactuals because it only partially identi￿es the model￿ s
parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up a dynamic model with
frictions. The bounds on intensive and extensive margin price elasticities are derived in
Section 3. Section 4 presents the application to labor supply and taxation. Section 5
concludes.
52 Demand Models with Frictions
Consider a dynamic model with N individuals who have heterogeneous tastes over two goods,
x and y. The price of x in period t is pt and the price of y is ￿xed at 1. Individual i has
wealth Zi and chooses demand by solving
max
xt;yt
T X
t=1
vi;t(xt;yt) s.t.
T X
t=1
[ptxt + yt] = Zi (1)
To simplify exposition, I make two simplifying assumptions in the main text. First, I assume
that agents face no uncertainty: prices pt evolve deterministically. Second, I use the following
speci￿cation of ￿ ow utility:
vi;t(xt;yt) = yt + ai;t
x
1￿1="
t
1 ￿ 1="
if " 6= 1 (2)
vi;t(xt;yt) = yt + ai;t logxt if " = 1
This quasilinear utility speci￿cation has three convenient properties: (1) it is a money metric,
(2) it makes the agent￿ s problem static because optimal demand for xt depends only on pt and
ai;t, and (3) it permits heterogeneity in demand levels but generates a constant price elasticity
". I show that the main result (Proposition 1) applies to the general case where vi;t(xt;yt) is
not quasilinear and prices pt are stochastic in Appendix A.
The utility function in (2) imples that optimal demand is x￿
i;t(pt) = (
ai;t
pt )". Let ￿ =
P
i
P
t logx￿
i;t(pt = 1)=NT denote the mean log demand in the population when pt = 1 and
￿i;t = logx￿
i;t(pt = 1)￿￿ denote the deviation of individual i in period t from the mean. Then
we can write agent i￿ s demand function as
logx￿
i;t(pt) = ￿ ￿ "logpt + ￿i;t
My objective is to identify ", the structural preference parameter that controls the price
elasticity of demand. More compactly, I refer to " as the ￿structural elasticity.￿ When
utility is quasilinear, the Hicksian (utility constant), Marshallian (wealth constant), and Frisch
(marginal utility constant) elasticities are all equal to ". The bounds derived below apply to
the Hicksian elasticity when utility is not quasilinear (see Appendix A). I therefore use " to
denote the Hicksian elasticity in the general model in (1), in which the three elasticities di⁄er.
6Consider identi￿cation of " using a price change from pA in period A to pB 6= pA in
period B.2 The standard assumption made to identify " from such variation is the following
orthogonality condition on the error term vi;t.
A1 Tastes are orthogonal to the identifying price variation: Evi;A = Evi;B.
Under this assumption,
" = ￿
Elogx￿
i;B(pB) ￿ Elogx￿
i;A(pA)
logpB ￿ logpA
(3)
Equation (3) shows that the observed response to a price change point identi￿es " in the
frictionless model in (1). I refer to (1) as the ￿nominal￿model, following the robust control
literature. I now show how optimization frictions a⁄ect the link between " and the observed
response using two examples.
Example 1: Adjustment Costs. Suppose the agent must pay an adjustment cost of ki;t to
change his consumption of x in period t. In this model, agent i chooses consumption xi;t in
period t by solving:
max
xt
T X
t=1
[ai;t
x
1￿1="
t
1 ￿ 1="
￿ ptxt ￿ ki;t ￿ (xt 6= xt￿1)]. (4)
Observed demand in this model, xi;t, di⁄ers from the frictionless optimum x￿
i;t. Let the
observed elasticity estimated from a price change between periods A and B be denoted by
b " = ￿
Elogxi;B(pB) ￿ Elogxi;A(pA)
logpB ￿ logpA
In this model, b " no longer identi￿es the structural elasticity ". The observed elasticity b " may
be smaller or larger than " depending upon the evolution of prices, adjustment costs, and
tastes. Nevertheless, the structural elasticity " still plays a central role in determining behav-
ior in steady-state. For example, the e⁄ects of permanent price variation across economies
starting in period 1 (e.g., countries with di⁄erent tax regimes) is determined purely by ".
Intuitively, adjustment costs a⁄ect observed elasticities primarily in the short-run, as agents
delay adjustment until periods with low switching costs.
2The analysis is una⁄ected if the identifying price variation comes from comparing two di⁄erent individuals
facing di⁄erent prices in the same period A, provided that the variation in pA is orthogonal to the variation in
tastes across individuals ￿i;A.
7Example 2: Price Misperceptions. A growing body of evidence indicates that individuals
misperceive prices, e.g. because of inattention to tax rates (DellaVigna 2009). To model this
class of deviations from (1), let e pi;t(pt) denote agent i￿ s perceived price as a function of the
true price in period t. The agent chooses xi;t by solving
max
xt
T X
t=1
[ai;t
x
1￿1="
t
1 ￿ 1="
￿ e pi;t(pt) ￿ xt] (5)
The resulting observed elasticity is
b " = "
Elog e pi;B(pB) ￿ Elog e pi;A(pA)
logpB ￿ logpA
Again, the observed elasticity b " confounds the structural elasticity of interest " with other
parameters, in this case the e⁄ect of the price change on mean perceived prices. But if
perceptions converge to the truth over time, steady-state behavior is determined solely by ".
Optimization Frictions and Partial Identi￿cation. The two examples above illustrate
why it is challenging to accurately model and fully identify structural models with frictions.
In the ￿rst example, full identi￿cation requires estimation of many primitives. The second
example is more challenging because it requires speci￿cation of a theory of perceptions e pi;t(pt).
This problem motivates a less ambitious strategy: identifying " without fully identifying the
primitive sources of optimization frictions. Identifying " is useful (though not always su¢ cient)
for both positive and normative analysis. As discussed in the examples above, " is su¢ cient
to predict steady-state responses under plausible conditions. The structural elasticity " and
the observed elasticity b " are together su¢ cient for welfare calculations in many applications
(Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009).
It is useful to recast the problem of identifying " with unknown frictions as a partial
identi￿cation problem. De￿ne agent i￿ s ￿optimization error￿as the log di⁄erence between his
optimal demand under the nominal model and his observed demand: ￿i;t = logxi;t ￿ logx￿
i;t.3
Then observed demand for agent i can be written as
logxi;t = ￿ ￿ "logpt + ￿i;t + ￿i;t (6)
De￿ne xt(pt) = [
N Q
i=1
xi;t(pt)]1=N and x￿
t(pt) = [
N Q
i=1
x￿
i;t(pt)]1=N as the geometric means of ob-
3The optimization error is an error from the econometrician￿ s perspective but not necessarily from the agent￿ s
perspective. In the adjustment cost model, the agent optimizes by choosing xi;t according to (4).
8served and optimal demands.4 Mean observed (log) demand is
logxt = Elogxi;t = logx￿
t(pt) + E￿i;t
Unlike the preference heterogeneity error ￿i;t, the optimization errors ￿i;t generated by fric-
tions are not orthogonal to changes in prices. For example, in the adjustment cost model,
mean observed demand may be at the optimum in period A (E￿i;A = 0), but above the new
optimum following a price increase in period B (E￿i;B > 0). Without assumptions on ￿i;t,
" is unidenti￿ed by the observed response Elogxi;B ￿ Elogxi;A. Intuitively, if one places no
restrictions on perceptions or adjustment costs, an observed response to a price change can be
reconciled with any structural price elasticity.
Restricting the Degree of Frictions. One can obtain bounds on " by restricting the support
of ￿i;t without making additional assumptions about E￿i;t. I restrict the support of ￿i;t by
requiring that agents make choices near the optimal choice under the nominal model. I obtain
a money-metric measure of the utility cost of setting x suboptimally for the general nominal
model in (1) using an expenditure function. Let U￿
i;t denote agent i￿ s total utility from periods
t to T under his optimal consumption plan. The minimum expenditure needed to attain U￿
i;t
when the agent sets xt at e xt is
ei;t(e xt) = min
xs;ys
T X
s=t
(psxs + ys) s.t.
T X
s=t
vi;t(xs;ys) ￿ U￿
i;t and xt = e xt.
The agent￿ s utility cost (measured in dollars) from setting xi;t suboptimally is ei;t(xi;t) ￿
ei;t(x￿
i;t). I restrict the size of optimization errors by requiring that the mean utility cost as a
fraction of optimal expenditure on good x is less than an exogenously speci￿ed threshold ￿:
1
N
P
i[ei;t(xi;t) ￿ ei;t(x￿
i;t)]=ptx￿
i;t ￿ ￿ (7)
The threshold ￿ measures the degree of optimization frictions, scaled as a percentage of ex-
penditure on good x. For instance, ￿ = 1% permits deviations from optimal demand with
an average utility cost of up to 1% of expenditure on xt.5 I measure utility costs under the
4The geometric mean is analytically convenient because individuals with di⁄erent levels of expenditure are
weighted equally in calculations of aggregate demand elasticities. If one de￿nes mean demand as an arithmetic
mean, the results below hold if the ￿ class of models in (7) is de￿ned as requiring that the expenditure-weighted
mean of utility costs is less than ￿.
5The appropriate choice of ￿ depends on the length of time that a period represents because ￿ is scaled by
expenditure per period ptx
￿
i;t. For instance, in a ￿xed adjustment cost model, one should set ￿ to be 12 times
larger when periods correspond to months rather than years.
9nominal model because in standard models with frictions (e.g. Example 1 above), agents￿
choices depend upon whether the gains from reoptimization ￿as calculated under the friction-
less model ￿exceed the size of the frictions. Because utility costs are calculated under the
nominal model, the results that follow require that the nominal model is correct in a frictionless
environment.
I refer to the models that generate observed demand levels xi;t that satisfy (7) as a ￿￿
class of models￿around the nominal model.6 The adjustment cost model in (4) lies in the
￿ class of models around (1) if the average adjustment cost as a percentage of expenditure
1
N
P
i ki;t=ptx￿
i;t ￿ ￿=2 in all periods t. Intuitively, if agents face adjustment costs of less than
￿=2, they will never tolerate a utility loss of more than ￿ by setting xt suboptimally because
they could always switch to x￿
t and then back to xt in period t + 1. Similarly, the model
of price misperceptions in (5) lies in the ￿ class of models around (1) if the expected utility
losses due to misperceptions are less than ￿ ￿that is, if perceptions are not too inaccurate on
average.
Although (7) is de￿ned based on the utility cost of setting demand suboptimally in a
single period, the ￿ class of models includes dynamic models in which agents make choices
based upon the present value of utility gains over their lifetimes. The reason is that with
a suitable choice of ￿, (7) provides a worst-case scenario for the choice of xt. For example,
in the adjustment cost model, forward-looking agents might switch xt to x￿
t even if the ￿ ow
utility gains from doing so are smaller than ki;t=2, because they can reap utility gains over
their lifetimes by paying the switching cost once. However, irrespective of the path of prices
and tastes, these forward-looking agents￿behavior will always satisfy (7) if ￿ is speci￿ed as
twice the mean adjustment cost. The choices of myopes who consider only ￿ ow utility gains
will also satisfy (7). The ￿ class of models thus encompasses a rich set of dynamic models of
behavior around the nominal model.
A ￿ class of models maps prices and primitives to a set of mean demand levels, which I
denote by
Xt(pt;￿) = fxt :
1
N
P
i[ei;t(xi;t) ￿ ei;t(x￿
i;t)]=ptx￿
i;t ￿ ￿g (8)
When utility is quasilinear, the choice set Xt(pt;￿) takes a particularly simple form. In the
6The restriction on xi;t in (7) is e⁄ectively a restriction on the support of the optimization error ￿i;t because
xi;t = x
￿
i;te
￿i;t
10quasilinear case, we can assume without loss of generality that the agent splits his wealth
equally across periods because the consumption path of yt does not a⁄ect utility. Then ￿ ow
utility as a function of xt is given by
ui;t(xt) = Zi=T ￿ ptxt + ai;t
x
1￿1="
t
1 ￿ 1="
In this case, (7) can be written as the set of demands that yield ￿ ow utility within ￿ units of
the optimum on average:
Xt(pt;￿) = fxt :
1
N
P
i[ui;t(x￿
i;t) ￿ ui;t(xi;t)]=ptx￿
i;t ￿ ￿g
Because the demand problem under the nominal model is e⁄ectively static with quasilinear
utility, the lifetime utility cost of setting xt suboptimally in period t is just the ￿ ow utility cost
of the error. Figure 1 illustrates the construction of the choice set X(pt;￿) with quasilinear
utility when there is no heterogeneity across agents and ￿ = 1%. The ￿gure plots ￿ ow utility
u(xt) when ai;t = e3:5, " = 1, logpt = 1, and Z=T = 100. The set of choices that yield utility
within ￿ = 1% of the optimum, X(pt;￿) = [10:2;14], is depicted by the interval on the x axis.
Now consider how a price increase from pA to pB a⁄ects mean observed demand in a ￿ class
of models. Figure 2a illustrates the choice sets at the two prices, X(pA;￿) and X(pB;￿), with
the same parameters as in Figure 1. The structural elasticity " controls the movement of the
choice sets with the price p, as illustrated by the dashed line. The solid lines illustrate that
various mean demand changes [logxB(pB) ￿ logxA(pA)] may be observed for a given value
of ". Each solid line is generated by a di⁄erent model. For instance, the ￿ at line could be
generated by a model with status quo bias or satis￿cing consumers. Over-reaction could be
observed in a model with adjustment costs, e.g. if there has been a history of price increases
in the past. One may even observe an increase in demand, for instance if the price increase
re￿ ects a change in tax policy that raises tax rates but makes taxes less salient.
These examples show that optimization frictions destroy the 1-1 map between the observed
response and the structural elasticity in (3). Let the range of structural elasticities consistent
with a given observed elasticity b " in a ￿ class of models be denoted by ("L(b ";￿);"U(b ";￿)).
The objective of this paper is to characterize "L and "U in terms of empirically estimable
parameters. The bounds ("L;"U) measure the uncertainty in the structural elasticity due to
potential mis-speci￿cation of the behavioral model, much as a statistical con￿dence interval
11measures the uncertainty in the parameter estimate due to sampling error.7
3 Bounds on Price Elasticities
I derive bounds on intensive margin elasticities in two steps. First, I characterize Xt(pt;￿),
the set of mean observed demands at a price pt for a given value of ". Second, I identify the
set of structural elasticities " consistent with an observed elasticity b ". After establishing these
results for the intensive margin case, I replicate the analysis for an extensive margin model
in which x is an indivisible good. Finally, I show how multiple observed elasticities can be
combined to obtain more informative bounds on the structural elasticity.
Throughout, I focus on identi￿cation of bounds on ", takingb " as an estimate from an in￿nite
sample. Inference about the bounds in ￿nite samples, where there is statistical imprecision in
the estimate of b ", can be handled using the techniques proposed by Imbens and Manski (2004)
or Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007).
3.1 Bounds on the Choice Set
The following lemma analytically characterizes Xt(p;￿) for small ￿ using a quadratic approxi-
mation to ￿ ow utility ui;t(x) in the quasilinear case.
Lemma 1. For small ￿, the set of mean observed demands is approximately
Xt(pt;￿) = fxt : jlogxt ￿ logx￿
tj ￿ [2"￿]1=2g
Proof. It is convenient to rewrite the de￿nition of the choice set in (8) as requiring that
ui;t(x￿
i;t)￿ui;t(xi;t) ￿ ￿i;tptx￿
i;t and 1
N
P
i ￿i;t ￿ ￿. Here ￿i;t can be interpreted as the degree of
frictions faced by agent i in period t. Taking a quadratic approximation to ui;t(x) = ui;t(elogx)
around logx￿
i;t and exploiting the ￿rst-order condition under the nominal model u0
i;t(x￿
i;t) = 0
yields
ui;t(x￿
i;t) ￿ ui;t(x) ’ ￿
1
2
(x￿
i;t)2u00
i;t(x￿
i;t)(logx ￿ logx￿
i;t)2 (9)
Therefore, agent i￿ s observed demand in period t must satisfy
jlogxi;t ￿ logx￿
i;tj ￿ [￿2￿i;t
pt
x￿
i;t
1
u00
i;t(x￿
i;t)
]1=2 (10)
7I characterize the range of " rather than other measures of dispersion because we typically lack a prior
distribution over the models within the ￿ class. A natural approach in such cases is to consider worst-case
scenarios (Hansen and Sargent 2007).
12With the quasilinear utility speci￿cation in (2), u00
i;t(xt) =
@2vi;t(xt)
@x2
t
and the ￿rst order condition
in the nominal model for xi;t is
@vi;t
@x (x￿
i;t(pt)) = pt. Implicitly di⁄erentiating this ￿rst order
condition yields
u00
i;t(x￿
i;t)
dx￿
i;t
dpt
= 1 (11)
Substituting (11) into (10) gives the following restriction on demand for each agent:
jlogxi;t ￿ logx￿
i;tj ￿ [2"￿i;t]1=2
To derive bounds on mean observed demand xt, use Jensen￿ s inequality to obtain:
jlogxt ￿ logx￿
tj = jElogxi;t ￿ Elogx￿
i;tj ￿ E[2"￿i;t]1=2 ￿ [2"￿]1=2
It follows that mean observed demand xt in a ￿ class of models satis￿es
jlogxt ￿ logx￿
tj ￿ [2"￿]1=2
Note that the approximation error in this equation vanishes as ￿ ! 0 because the remainder
of the Taylor approximation in (9) involves higher-order terms.
Lemma 1 captures three intuitions. First, the width of the choice set, which is 2[2"￿]1=2
log units, shrinks at a square-root rate as ￿ goes to zero. This result implies that even small
optimization frictions ￿ can generate substantial variation in observed behavior. With a price
elasticity of " = 1 and ￿ = 1%, the choice set extends approximately +/-14% around x￿(pt),
as illustrated in Figure 1. The root-￿ shrinkage of the choice set is driven by the second-order
losses of deviating from the maximum of a smooth function (Akerlof and Yellen 1985, Mankiw
1985).
Second, equation (10) shows that the width of the choice set is inversely related to the
curvature of utility around the optimum, u00
i;t(x￿
i;t). A useful property of the model is that
u00
i;t(x￿
i;t) is pinned down by ", the structural parameter of interest. Highly curved utilities
generate small structural elasticities because the agent has a strong preference to locate near
x￿
i;t. For example, suppose the demand for an essential medicine is perfectly price inelastic
at a level x￿
i;t. The price elasticity of demand approaches zero as the curvature of the utility
function approaches in￿nity ￿agents demand the medicine at any price only if they lose in￿nite
utility by not having it. Because the utility costs of deviating from x￿
i;t are in￿nitely large,
13the choice set Xt(pt;￿) collapses to the singleton x￿
t for any ￿ when " = 0, as illustrated in
Figure 2b. The choice set expands as " rises. This connection between " and the curvature of
utility is critical because it eliminates the need to estimate the additional parameter u00
i;t(x￿
i;t)
when bounding ".
Finally, the set of mean observed demands depends only upon the mean level of frictions
￿, and not the distribution of frictions at the individual level ￿i;t. Because each individual￿ s
choice set is proportional to [￿i;t]1=2, the potential di⁄erence between mean observed and
optimal demand is largest (the worst-case scenario) when ￿i;t = ￿ for all i;t.
3.2 Bounds on the Structural Elasticity
Figure 3a depicts the largest structural elasticity " that could have generated an observed
elasticity b " for a price increase from pA to pB. When " = "U, mean observed demand lies at
the bottom of the choice set at price pA (logxA(pA) = logx￿
A(pA) ￿ (2"￿)1=2) and the top of
the choice set at price pB (logxB(pB) = logx￿
B(pB)+(2"￿)1=2). The upper bound "U therefore
satis￿es the condition
b " = ￿
logxB(pB) ￿ logxA(pA)
log(pB) ￿ log(pA)
= ￿
logx￿
B(pB) ￿ logx￿
A(pA) + 2(2"￿)1=2
log(pB) ￿ log(pA)
= "U ￿ 2
(2"U￿)1=2
￿logp
(12)
where ￿logp = jlog(pB) ￿ log(pA)j.8 Similarly, the lower bound structural elasticity "L
consistent with b ", illustrated in Figure 3b, is de￿ned by the equation
b " = "L + 2
(2"L￿)1=2
￿logp
(13)
The following proposition characterizes the solutions to (12) and (13).
Proposition 1. Under assumption A1, for small ￿, the range of structural elasticities consis-
tent with an observed elasticity b " is approximately ("L;"U) where
"L = b " +
4￿
(￿logp)2(1 ￿ ￿) and "U = b " +
4￿
(￿logp)2(1 + ￿) (14)
with ￿ = (1 +
1
2
b "
￿
(￿logp)2)1=2
Proof. Equations (12) and (13) both reduce to the quadratic equation (b " ￿ ")2 = 8"￿
(￿logp)2.
The upper and lower roots of this quadratic equation are the bounds.
8With ￿logp de￿ned as the absolute value of the log price change, the results below also apply to price
reductions.
14Equation (14) maps the magnitude of the price change (￿log p), the observed elasticity
b ", and the degree of frictions ￿ to bounds on the structural elasticity " when ￿ ow utility is
quasilinear.9 In Appendix A, I show that when utility is not quasilinear, Proposition 1 applies
to the Hicksian elasticity. In particular, if the demand function is isoelastic between pA and
pB, an observed Hicksian elasticity b " generates bounds on the structural Hicksian elasticity "
given by exactly the same formula as (14). The discussion that follows therefore applies to
Hicksian elasticities in the general model in (1).
The dashed lines in Figure 4 show the bounds ("L;"U) as a function of b " with ￿ = 1% of
expenditure.10 Panel A considers a price change of ￿logp = 20%, while Panel B considers
￿logp = 40%. The bounds o⁄er several insights into what can be learned about structural
elasticities from reduced-form estimates of observed elasticities. First, larger price changes are
much more informative about " because the bounds shrink at a quadratic rate with ￿logp.
With a price change of 20%, an observed elasticity of b " = 0:2 is consistent with structural
elasticities up to "U = 2:3. With ￿logp = 40% and b " = 0:2, "U = 0:85. The reason for this
rapid shrinkage is that the movement in the choice sets for a given value of " is larger when
￿logp is larger, resulting in a narrower set of observed responses b " consistent with any given
".
Second, the bounds are asymmetric around the observed elasticity: "U ￿b " > b "￿"L. This
asymmetry is driven by the proportional relationship between the width of the choice sets
and ", as shown in Lemma 1. Large structural elasticities generate wide choice sets and are
therefore consistent with a broader range of b " than small structural elasticities. A related
implication is that if " is small, there will be little dispersion in observed elasticities across
studies, whereas a large " may lead to substantial variation in observed elasticities.
Third, the lower bound is strictly positive ("L > 0) whenever b " > 0 regardless of ￿. If
" = 0, the choice sets collapse to a single point x￿
t(pA) = x￿
t(pB) as shown in Lemma 1, and
one will therefore never observe positive values of b ". Agents intent on maintaining a ￿xed
9When b " is a ￿nite-sample estimate, a 95% con￿dence set for " can be obtained by computing "L using the
lower limit of the 90% con￿dence interval for b " and "U using the upper limit of the 90% con￿dence interval
under certain regularity conditions (Imbens and Manski 2004).
10These bounds are computed using (14), which relies on a quadratic approximation to utility. To evaluate
the quality of the approximation, I calculated the exact bounds with the utility in (2) numerically for a range
of values of b " < 1, ￿logp < 100%, and ￿ = 1%. In all cases, the exact and approximate bounds di⁄er by less
than 0:001, showing that (14) is su¢ ciently accurate for most applications.
15value of x must face very large costs of deviating from the optimum and therefore will never
do so.11 This result is useful for hypothesis testing: ￿nding b " > 0 is adequate to reject the
null of a zero structural elasticity regardless of frictions.
Finally, consider the converse case of a study that detects zero observed behavioral response
(b " = 0).12 When b " = 0, the bounds take a particularly simple form. The lower bound is
"L = 0. The upper bound can be conveniently expressed in terms of the utility cost of
ignoring the price change for an optimizing agent with time-invariant preferences. Consider
a hypothetical agent who has ￿xed tastes ai;t = ai across periods A and B and is initially at
his nominal optimum x￿
i(pA). Using a quadratic approximation analogous to that in Lemma
1, this agent￿ s utility loss from failing to change demand to x￿
i(pB) in period B is
￿ui ￿ ui;B(x￿
i(pB)) ￿ ui;B(x￿
i(pA)) ’ ￿
1
2
u00
i;B(x￿
i;B)(logx￿
i;B ￿ logx￿
i;A)2(x￿
i;B)2.
Using equation (11), the utility loss from failing to reoptimize in response to a price change
as a percentage of the optimal expenditure level at price pB is
￿u%(") =
￿ui
pBx￿
i(pB)
=
1
2
(￿logp)2" (15)
The utility loss ￿u%(") is an increasing function of the structural elasticity ". The following
result shows that the upper bound on " when b " = 0 can be expressed in terms of ￿u%("U).
Corollary 1. Under assumption A1, for a given value of ", the observed elasticity b " can be 0
only if ￿u%(") ￿ 4￿.
Proof. When b " = 0, (14) implies "U = 8￿=(￿logp)2. Combining this equation with (15)
yields the result.
Corollary 1 provides a simple method of determining the range of structural elasticities
for which one can be sure to detect a behavioral response. Starting from the optimum, the
percentage utility cost of ignoring a price change given an elasticity of " must exceed 4￿ to
guarantee an observed elasticity b " > 0. The 4￿ condition is obtained because the cost of
deviating from the optimum rises at a quadratic rate (see Appendix A for details). When
b " = 0, "U shrinks at a quadratic rate with ￿logp but only a linear rate with ￿. Studying
11By the same reasoning, b " < 0 implies " > 0, as one could never observe a negative response if " = 0. Note
that negative structural elasticities (" < 0) are ruled out by agent optimization in the nominal model.
12Among the feasible responses in a ￿ class of models, a zero response is perhaps the most likely outcome, as
it requires no adjustments or attention.
16a price change that is twice as large yields more information about " even if frictions are
also twice as large, underscoring the value of placing greater weight on large treatments for
identi￿cation.
3.3 Extensive Margin Elasticities
I now replicate the analysis above for the case where x is an indivisible good and agents make
extensive margin choices about whether to buy x. To analyze extensive margin responses,
consider the model in (1) with the quasilinear ￿ ow utility in (2), but assume that x 2 f0;1g,
so that agents make a discrete choice.
It is optimal for an agent to buy the good if its utility exceeds its price, i.e. if bi;t ￿
ai;t
1￿ 1
"
>
pt. Let the distribution of the rescaled taste parameter bi;t in the population be given by a
smooth cdf Ft(bi;t) with positive support for all bi;t > 0. I make an identi￿cation assumption
analogous to A1 to ensure that elasticity estimates are unbiased without frictions:
A1￿Tastes are orthogonal to the identifying price variation: FA = FB.
Let ￿￿
t = 1 ￿ Ft(pt) denote the optimal fraction of agents who buy x and ￿t denote the
observed fraction who buy x in period t. The structural extensive margin demand elasticity for
a price change from pA to pB is ￿(pA;pB) ￿
log￿￿
B(pB)￿log￿￿
A(pA)
log(pB)￿log(pA) . The corresponding observed
extensive margin elasticity is b ￿(pA;pB) ￿
log￿B(pB)￿log￿A(pA)
log(pB)￿log(pA) . Because the density f(p) varies
with the price, ￿(pA;pB) varies with the price. To bound ￿(pA;pB), I assume that the
aggregate demand function is locally iso-elastic.
A2 The extensive margin elasticity is constant between pA and pB: ￿(pt) = ￿@￿￿
@pt
pt
￿￿ =
￿(pA;pB) for pt 2 [pA;pB].
Let ￿ denote the degree of frictions permitted as a fraction of expenditure when buying
the good, pt. Then a ￿ class of models around the nominal extensive margin model can be
de￿ned by requiring that average utility losses are less than ￿pt, as shown in Appendix A. I
now establish a set of results analogous to those in the intensive margin case. The proofs
of these results, which are given in the appendix, use ￿rst-order Taylor approximations and
parallel those for the intensive margin.
Lemma 2. For small ￿, the set of participation rates is approximately
￿t(pt;￿) = f￿t : jlog￿t ￿ log￿￿
tj ￿ ￿(pt)￿g
17The width of the choice set is directly proportional to the structural elasticity ￿ and the degree
of frictions ￿. The structural elasticity matters because it is proportional to the density of
the taste distribution f(pt). If ￿(pt) is large, many agents are near indi⁄erent between buying
x and not buying x at price pt and experience small utility costs by choosing x suboptimally.
This leads to greater variation in ￿t.
The critical di⁄erence between Lemma 2 and its intensive margin analog, Lemma 1, is that
the width of the choice set for participation rates is proportional to ￿ rather than ￿1=2. This
makes the choice set much narrower on the extensive margin than the intensive margin. With
￿ = 1% and a structural elasticity of 1, the choice set spans ￿1% of optimal aggregate demand
on the extensive margin, compared with ￿14% on the intensive margin. The choice set is
much narrower because individuals incur ￿rst-order utility losses from choosing x suboptimally
on the extensive margin since they are not near interior optima.
The lower and upper bounds on ￿ given an observed elasticity b ￿ can be characterized as in
Figure 3b, leading to the following analog of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Under assumptions A1￿and A2, for small ￿, the range of structural elasticities
consistent with an observed elasticity b ￿ is approximately (￿L;￿U) where
￿L = b ￿=(1 + ￿n) and ￿U =
￿
b ￿=(1 ￿ ￿￿) if ￿￿ < 1
1 if ￿￿ ￿ 1
(16)
where ￿￿ =
2￿
￿logp
.
Because the choice set grows linearly with ￿ on the extensive margin, the bounds on ￿ are
more sensitive to the level of frictions. If the level of frictions is su¢ ciently large relative
to the size of the identifying variation (2￿ > ￿logp), the ￿ is unbounded above because the
choice sets widen more rapidly than they shift as ￿ rises. Intuitively, even if no one responds
to a small price change on the extensive margin, there could nevertheless be a large lurking
density of agents who are very close to indi⁄erent between buying and not buying x, generating
arbitrarily large ￿. In contrast, on the intensive margin, we obtain a ￿nite upper bound on "
for any price change because the choice set grows more slowly (in proportion to (")1=2) with ".
Conversely, when frictions are relatively small, the bounds on ￿ are much tighter than those
on " for a given ￿ because the choice set is much narrower on the extensive margin. This is
illustrated by the dotted lines in Figure 4, which show the extensive margin bounds (￿L;￿U)
18as a function of b ￿. With ￿ = 1% and a price change of 20%, an observed elasticity of b ￿ = 0:2
is consistent with extensive margin structural elasticities up to ￿U = 0:22, in contrast with
the upper bound of "U = 2:3 for the same parameters on the intensive margin. In practice,
most empirical studies generate tight bounds on ￿ for plausible levels of ￿, as shown in the
application below. For instance, with ￿ = 1% frictions, one needs a price change of just 2%
to obtain a ￿nite upper bound on ￿.
One can also establish an analog to Corollary 1 by considering the utility cost of not
responding to a price change for the agent who is just indi⁄erent between buying and not
buying at price pA, i.e. the agent with bi = pA. Let
￿uext;% =
jpB ￿ pAj
pB
’ ￿logp (17)
denote the utility cost to this agent (as a percentage of expenditure on x when participating)
of choosing x suboptimally when the price is changed to pB.13 The utility cost of ignoring
a price change is a ￿rst-order function of ￿logp on the extensive margin, in contrast with
the second-order cost on the intensive margin in (15). Intuitively, non-participants enjoy the
bene￿ts of a price cut only if they reoptimize their behavior and enter the market. In contrast,
on the intensive margin, the ￿rst-order increase in wealth from the price cut is automatically
obtained; the bene￿t of reoptimization is only the second-order gain of choosing a better level
of consumption.
Corollary 2. Under assumptions A1￿and A2, if ￿ > 0 then b ￿ can be 0 only if ￿uext,% ￿ 2￿.
If the utility cost of ignoring the price change for the marginal agent exceeds 2￿, we must
observe b ￿ > 0 if ￿ > 0. Because the utility losses from ignoring price changes are ￿rst-order
on the extensive margin, price changes induce behavioral responses even with substantial
frictions. A 20% change in the price could produce b ￿ = 0 only with frictions of ￿ > 10%
when ￿ > 0. In contrast, the same 20% change could produce b " = 0 on the intensive margin
with a structural elasticity of " = 0:5 even with ￿ = 0:25%. Frictions have smaller e⁄ects on
aggregate demand when microeconomic choices are discrete rather than continuous because
the costs of suboptimal choice are concentrated among the marginal agents with bi ’ pA.14
13For price cuts, the relevant utility cost is for a marginal agent who was not buying x at price pA; for
price increases, the relevant utility cost is for an agent who was buying x at pA. Intuitively, the agent who
experiences the largest utility cost ￿uext,% determines the lower bound on b ￿.
14If the aggregate costs of suboptimal choice were shared across all agents, they would become a second-order
function of ￿logp because the fraction of agents who lose utility by not reoptimizing is proportional to ￿logp.
193.4 Combining Multiple Observed Elasticities
One can obtain more information about the structural elasticity by combining multiple ob-
served elasticities. I demonstrate this for the intensive margin, but the results that follow
apply identically to extensive margin elasticities. Suppose we have a set of observed elastici-
ties fb "1;:::;b "Jg from J empirical studies. Let ￿logpj denote the size of the price change used
to identify observed elasticity j. Let "
j
L and "
j
U denote the lower and upper bounds implied
by study j, derived using Proposition 1. Let "max
L = max("
j
L) denote the largest lower bound
and "min
U = min("
j
U) denote the least upper bound. Then it follows that " 2 ("max
L ;"min
U ).
By calculating ("max
L ;"min
U ) as a function of ￿, one can assess how sensitive estimates of "
are to frictions. One value of special interest is the smallest ￿ that reconciles the observed
elasticities, ￿min. When ￿ = ￿min, the structural elasticity " is point identi￿ed. To characterize
this minimum-￿ value of ", let b "1 denote the observed elasticity that produces the least upper
bound and b "2 the observed elasticity that produces the highest lower bound when ￿ = ￿min.
The minimum-￿ estimate of " satis￿es "￿-min = "U(b "1;￿min) = "L(b "2;￿min). Solving these two
equations using the de￿nitions of "U and "L in (12) and (13) yields the following estimator:
"￿-min =
￿logp1b "1 + ￿logp2b "2
￿logp1 + ￿logp2
(18)
Equation (18) also applies to extensive margin elasticities: ￿￿￿min is the same weighted average
of the pivotal observed elasticities.
The "￿-min estimator for the structural elasticity has two attractive features. First, it does
not require exogenous speci￿cation of ￿. Second, if one were to observe all possible elasticities
b " generated by a ￿ class of models, the smallest level of frictions that could reconcile the
observed values of b " would be ￿min = ￿, resulting in "￿-min = ". In this sense, "￿-min converges
to " if observed elasticities are estimated in a su¢ ciently rich set of environments.
The value of ￿min can be used to formally de￿ne ￿economically signi￿cant￿di⁄erences. If
￿min is small, the di⁄erences in estimates are not economically signi￿cant in that they can
be reconciled simply by allowing for small frictions rather than fundamentally changing the
economic model. In analogy with reporting the statistical signi￿cance of di⁄erences between
estimates, the economic signi￿cance of a new estimate can be quanti￿ed by reporting the ￿min
required to reconcile it with prior evidence.
204 Application: Labor Supply
The wage elasticity of labor supply is a parameter of central interest for tax policy analysis and
macroeconomic models. A large literature in labor economics, macroeconomics, and public
￿nance estimates this elasticity using various methods. There are many frictions that may
make observed labor supply di⁄er from optimal labor supply, such as costs of switching jobs
(Altonji and Paxson 1992), inertia (Jones 2008), and inattention (Chetty and Saez 2009). But
few studies that estimate labor supply elasticities account for such frictions. The methods
developed above are therefore well suited to extracting the information these studies contain
about the structural labor supply elasticity.
I analyze the e⁄ects of frictions on four strands of the labor supply literature: (1) inten-
sive margin elasticities, (2) extensive margin elasticities, (3) non-linear budget set estimation,
and (4) macroeconomic elasticity estimates. Throughout, I focus on identifying Hicksian
elasticities relevant for steady-state comparisons. I discuss the implications of the analysis
for the Frisch (intertemporal substitution) elasticity relevant for understanding business cycle
￿ uctuations in the context of the fourth application.
4.1 Intensive Margin Elasticities
Following MaCurdy (1981), I characterize structural labor supply elasticities in a lifecycle
model in which agents choose consumption (ct) and hours of work (lt) to solve
max
ct;lt
T X
t=1
vi;t(ct;lt) s.t.
T X
t=1
[Yi;t + (1 ￿ ￿t)wlt ￿ ct] = 0 (19)
where ￿t denotes the tax rate in period t, w denotes the wage rate, and Yi;t denotes unearned
(non-wage) income. Let l
c;￿
t (￿t) denote the structural Hicksian labor supply function generated
by (19). Note that (19) is equivalent to the demand model in (1) with leisure as one of the
consumption goods. Because the Hicksian wage elasticity of leisure coincides with the Hicksian
wage elasticity of labor supply, Proposition A1 can be used to bound the structural labor supply
elasticity " =
logl
c;￿
B (￿B)￿logl
c;￿
A (￿A)
log(1￿￿B)￿log(1￿￿A) . In this application, ￿logp = ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) and ￿ measures
frictions in choosing labor supply as a percentage of net-of-tax earnings (1 ￿ ￿t)wl
c;￿
t .
I evaluate the impact of frictions on intensive margin elasticities in two steps. I begin by
simulating the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes used for identi￿cation in the micro-
21econometric literature. I ￿nd that the costs are typically quite small, suggesting that frictions
might substantially attenuate observed elasticities (Corollary 1). I then calculate bounds on
the structural Hicksian labor supply elasticity using existing estimates of observed elasticities.
4.1.1 Utility Costs of Ignoring Tax Changes
I calculate the costs of ignoring tax changes with quasilinear, iso-elastic ￿ ow utility:
vi;t(ct;lt) = ct ￿ ai
l
1+1="
t
1 + 1="
. (20)
Let Tt(wl) denote an agent￿ s tax liability as a function of his taxable income in year t. Since
the path of consumption has no impact on the utility costs of choosing l suboptimally when
utility is quasilinear, I assume without loss of generality that the agent sets consumption equal
to net-of-tax income. Then ￿ ow utility as a function of the labor supply choice and tax regime
is
ui(l;Tt) = wl ￿ Tt(wl) ￿ ai
l1+1="
1 + 1="
(21)
I consider tax changes over a three year interval, following the convention in the literature
(Gruber and Saez 2002). Let l￿
i;t denote optimal labor supply in period t under the nominal
model in (19). The utility loss in dollars from ignoring the tax changes that occur between
years t ￿ 3 and t for an individual who sets labor supply at the optimum in year t ￿ 3 is:15
￿ui;t = ui(l￿
i;t;Tt) ￿ ui(l￿
i;t￿3;Tt)
I calculate l￿
i;t and ￿ui;t numerically for various values of ai and years t.16 I use a structural
elasticity of " = 0:5, the upper bound on " estimated below, to obtain upper bounds on utility
losses. The tax rates Tt(wl) are obtained from the NBER TAXSIM calculator, including both
employer and employee payroll taxes but ignoring state taxes. I consider a single tax ￿ler
with two children who has only labor income and no deductions other than those for children.
I adjust for in￿ ation in the wage w using the CPI over the relevant three-year period.17
15The results below do not assume that all agents start at the optimum in the base year; they only require
that choices in the base year lie within a ￿ class of models. I calculate utility costs for agents who start at
the optimum because this calculation tells us whether b " = 0 is consistent with a given structural elasticity
(Corollary 1).
16The only heterogeneity across agents in these calculations is the disutility of labor ai, which generates
di⁄erences in pre-tax earnings. Heterogeneity in wi is isomorphic to heterogeneity in ai in (20).
17A STATA program TAXCOST.ado that calculates the utility cost of ignoring tax reforms has been posted
on the NBER server. TAXCOST takes exactly the same inputs as TAXSIM. By running TAXCOST instead of
TAXSIM, researchers can calculate the utility costs of ignoring the tax changes they are using for identi￿cation.
See http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/taxcost.html for further information.
22Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) is one of the largest
reforms in the U.S. tax code and the focus of many empirical studies. Figure 5 evaluates the
costs of ignoring this tax reform. Panel A shows the marginal tax rate schedules in 1985 (thick
red line) and 1988 (thin blue line). The dashed blue line, which is replicated in all the panels
as a reference, shows the log change in the marginal net-of-tax rate (NTR), ￿log(1￿MTR).
TRA86 increased the NTR by 15-20% for those with incomes below $100,000 and by nearly
40% for those with incomes close to $200,000.
Panel B plots the utility cost (measured in dollars) of ignoring the tax change (￿ui;1988)
vs. gross taxable income in 1985.18 For instance, an individual whose taste parameter
ai placed him at an optimal taxable income of $100,000 prior to TRA86 would lose $1,000
by failing to reoptimize labor supply in response to the change in the tax code. Panel
C plots the cost of ignoring the tax reform as a percentage of consumption, ￿ui;1988;% =
￿ui;1988=(wl￿
i;1988 ￿T1988(wl￿
i;1988). Most individuals earning less than $100,000 lose less than
1% of net earnings by ignoring TRA86 when choosing labor supply in 1988. Using Corollary
1, this result implies that frictions of ￿ = 1% could lead to an observed elasticity of b " = 0 from
TRA86 for an individual earning less than $100,000 even if his underlying structural elasticity
were " = 0:5.19
Finally, Panel D plots the change in taxable income (wl￿
i;1988 ￿ wl￿
i;1985) required to reop-
timize relative to TRA86. With " = 0:5, a taxpayer earning $100,000 prior to the reform
would have to increase his pre-tax earnings by $13,000 in order to reach his new optimum.
This substantial change would yield a utility gain (net of the disutility of added labor) of only
$1,000. Given that the search costs of immediately ￿nding additional work that pays an extra
$13,000 could well exceed $1,000, it is plausible that many individuals would not respond to
TRA86 within a three-year horizon.20
18Values at non-convex kinks in the base year are interpolated to obtain a continuous curve. Since no
individual would optimally locate at a non-convex kink, the utility cost is unde￿ned at these points.
19Corollary 1 applies to individuals who are at an interior optimum both before and after the tax change. In
particular, a tax change could produce an observed elasticity b " = 0 if the level of frictions ￿ > ￿ui;t;%(")=4 for
such individuals. For individuals who optimally locate at kinks between tax brackets, the tangency conditions
used to derive Corollary 1 do not hold. However, even for these agents, it is clear that a tax change could
produce b " = 0 if ￿ > ￿ui;t;%(").
20The total lifetime gain from reoptimizing labor supply is much larger because the agent gains $1,000 every
year. However, because the ￿ ow utility gains are relatively small, many agents may delay adjustment until a
period where frictions (e.g. job switching costs) are lower. Thus, micro studies might not detect much change
in labor supply between 1985 and 1988 even if TRA86 induced individuals to reoptimize in the long run.
23The costs of ignoring TRA86 are considerably larger for high income earners. An individual
earning $200,000 in 1985 would lose $4,500 per year (nearly 3% of net earnings) by ignoring
the tax reform. High income individuals gain a lot more from reoptimizing both because
the dollars at stake rise with income and because the change in tax rates was larger for high
incomes.
Figure 6a extends the analysis of tax reforms to cover all tax changes from 1970-2006. I
compute the percentage utility loss (￿ui;t;%) from ignoring tax changes at the 20th, 50th, and
99.5th percentile of the household income distribution. The value plotted for year t is the
percentage utility cost of choosing l￿
i;t￿3 instead of l￿
i;t in year t. There is no tax change since
1970 for which the utility cost of failing to reoptimize on the intensive margin exceeds 1% of
net earnings for the median taxpayer. The utility costs of ignoring tax reforms are substantial
only for the top 1% of income earners around TRA86. Correspondingly, the largest observed
elasticities in historical time series are for top income earners around TRA86; for lower income
groups and other time periods, observed intensive margin elasticities are near zero (Saez 2004).
While there is little gain from adjusting behavior to optimally react to tax changes on the
intensive margin over any three year interval, it is not the case that ignoring taxes completely
imposes little cost. For example, using equation (15), the utility cost of ignoring a tax rate
of ￿ = 40% and working l￿(￿ = 0) hours is 1
2 ￿ 1
2 ￿ (0:4)2 = 4% of net earnings per year when
" = 0:5. This is why short-run responses to tax reforms may not be very informative about
how the tax system a⁄ects labor supply on the intensive margin in steady state.
4.1.2 Bounds on the Intensive Margin Hicksian Elasticity
How much can be learned about the structural Hicksian labor supply elasticity (") from existing
elasticity estimates? To answer this question, I apply Proposition A1 to calculate the bounds
on " implied by a set of well-known studies of intensive margin labor supply. One should keep
two caveats in mind when interpreting the results of the exercise. First, I assume a constant
structural elasticity " across all the studies, ignoring potential variation in local preferences
across tax regimes, income levels, demographic groups, or countries. Second, I assume that
each study provides an unbiased estimate of the observed elasticity b ". Econometric issues
such as omitted variables and mean reversion may bias some of the estimates (Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz 2011). Any such biases would pass through to the bounds.
24Table I divides the studies of intensive margin labor supply into four groups: (A) studies
that measure labor supply using hours of work; (B) studies that measure labor supply using
taxable income; (C) studies that use taxable income but focus exclusively on top income earn-
ers; and (D) studies that rely on cross-sectional comparisons (across countries with di⁄erent
tax regimes or individuals with di⁄erent wage rates) to estimate steady-state hours elastici-
ties.21 The table lists the point estimate and standard error of the observed Hicksian elasticity
and the change in the net-of-tax rate used for identi￿cation. Details on the calculations and
sources for each study are given in Appendix B. For quasi-experimental studies that analyze
a single tax change, I de￿ne ￿log(1￿MTR) as the change in the mean MTR for the treat-
ment group (e.g. top income earners in Feldstein (1995)). For studies that pool tax or wage
changes of di⁄erent sizes (e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002), I de￿ne ￿log(1￿MTR) as twice the
standard deviation of ￿log(1￿MTR) in the sample. This is the size of the single price change
that would generate the same statistical precision as the variation in ￿log(1￿MTR) used for
identi￿cation, as shown in Appendix B.
The observed elasticity estimates vary substantially across studies. Microeconometric
studies of the full population ￿nd the smallest elasticities: the mean observed hours and taxable
income elasticities among the studies considered in Panels A and B is 0.15. Studies of top
income earners ￿nd much larger elasticities, with a mean of 0.84. The mean elasticity among
macroeconomic studies of steady-state responses is 0.32.
The largest observed elasticities in Panels A and B are obtained from the studies that
focus on the largest changes in tax policy: the abolition of the income tax for a year in Iceland
(Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega 2001) and a Swedish tax reform in 1991 termed the ￿tax
reform of the century￿(Gelber 2010). This pattern is consistent with the view that frictions
are less likely to attenuate short-run responses to very large price changes. Excluding the
Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega and Gelber studies, every point estimate in Panels A and
B is below all of the point estimates in Panels C and D. Moreover, many of the con￿dence
intervals for b " in Panels A and B do not overlap with the con￿dence intervals for b " in Panels
C and D. Hence, the systematic di⁄erences in point estimates of observed elasticities across
21In the model in (19), the hours and taxable income elasticities are the same. I therefore pool estimates
from both types of studies to bound the structural labor supply elasticity in this model. In more general
models, taxable income elasticities may be larger than hours elasticities because they incorporate changes in
reporting and avoidance behavior as well as changes in work e⁄ort (Slemrod 1995).
25the studies in the di⁄erent groups cannot be explained by statistical imprecision.
Can frictions explain the di⁄erences in the estimates? Columns 6-7 of Table I show the
bounds ("L;"U) implied by each point estimate with frictions of ￿ = 1% of net earnings. Many
studies that use small tax changes are consistent with structural elasticities above 1 despite
obtaining small estimates. Figure 7 gives a visual representation of the bounds in columns
6-7. For scaling purposes, I exclude studies that use variation in net-of-tax rates of less than
20% for identi￿cation. None of the intervals plotted in the ￿gure are disjoint ￿that is, all
the estimates are consistent with a single structural Hicksian elasticity " if one permits 1%
frictions. Hence, the di⁄erences in estimates across high and low income earners as well as
the di⁄erences in estimates across macroeconomic and microeconometric studies can be fully
explained by small frictions.
Although any one study by itself produces wide bounds, the studies in Table I yield infor-
mative bounds on the Hicksian elasticity when combined. Intuitively, by estimating elasticities
in many environments, one can obtain much sharper bounds on ". The uni￿ed lower bound
across the studies when ￿ = 1% is "L = 0:47, obtained from Goolsbee￿ s (1999) analysis of
TRA86. The uni￿ed upper bound is "U = 0:51, obtained from Blau and Kahn￿ s (2007) esti-
mate using cross-sectional wage variation in the U.S. These bounds are robust in the sense that
even if one excludes these two pivotal studies, the uni￿ed bounds expand only to (0:44;0:54),
with the pivotal estimates now coming from Kopczuk (2010) and Gelber (2010).
While it is instructive to demonstrate that frictions can explain the di⁄erences in estimates
between Panels B and C, the large elasticities for top income earners most likely re￿ ect ma-
nipulation of reported taxable income rather than changes in labor supply (Slemrod 1995).
One may also question the validity of the estimates in Panel D because of the many omitted
variables and other factors that could bias cross-sectional comparisons (Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote 2005). If we only include the studies in Panels A and B, the uni￿ed bounds are
(0:28;0:54). These more conservative bounds are my preferred range of estimates for the
structural labor supply elasticity with ￿ = 1% frictions.
Figure 8 shows how the uni￿ed bounds vary with the degree of frictions. The dark shaded
region shows the values of " consistent with the observed elasticities in Panels A and B of
Table I for ￿ 2 (0;5%). The bounds widen as ￿ rises, but remain somewhat informative even
with ￿ = 5%, where "L = 0:15 and "U = 1:23. Given that individuals are unlikely to tolerate
26utility losses equivalent to 5% of net earnings per year on average, we can rule out " < 0:15 (as
suggested by some microeconometric studies) or " > 1:23 (as used in some macro calibrations)
based on existing evidence.
The smallest value of ￿ that can reconcile the observed elasticity estimates in Panels A
and B is ￿min = 0:5%. That is, the di⁄erences in these 15 observed elasticity estimates are
￿economically signi￿cant￿only if frictions in choosing labor supply are less than 0:5% of net
earnings on average. The corresponding minimum-￿ point estimate of the structural elasticity
is "￿-min = 0:33. This value of 0:33 is my preferred point estimate of the structural intensive
margin Hicksian elasticity adjusted for frictions. Interestingly, this value is similar to the
point estimates obtained from studies that are less susceptible to frictions to begin with ￿the
steady-state cross-sectional comparisons in Panel D and the micro studies of large tax changes
discussed above.
Columns 8-9 of Table I show a 95% con￿dence set for the " implied by each study. These
columns use the lower endpoint of the 90% con￿dence interval (CI) for b " to calculate "L and
the upper endpoint of the 90% CI to calculate "U (Imbens and Manski 2004), assuming that
b " is normally distributed. In many cases, the 95% con￿dence sets are only slightly wider than
the bounds obtained when ignoring sampling error. For instance, "U for Gelber￿ s estimate for
men rises from 0:54 to 0:59. A 95% con￿dence set for the uni￿ed bounds can be constructed
by using a simple Bonferroni bound.22 The 95% con￿dence set for the uni￿ed bounds is
(0:23;0:61) when using the studies in Panels A and B. These calculations indicate that the
greater source of imprecision in labor supply elasticities is uncertainty about the economic
model of behavior due to frictions rather than noise due to sampling error.
4.2 Extensive Margin Elasticities
I now apply the results in Section 3.3 to explain why microeconometric estimates of observed
elasticities on the extensive margin are larger than those on the intensive margin (Heckman
1993). As above, I ￿rst calculate the utility costs of ignoring tax changes on the extensive
margin and then apply Proposition 2 to bound the extensive margin Hicksian elasticity.
22Given J estimates fb "1;:::;b "Jg, let ("
j;CI
L ,"
j;CI
U ) denote a 1￿:05=J percent con￿dence interval for " for study
j, calculated using the method in Imbens and Manski (2004) as above. The intersection of these J regions is a
(conservative) 95% CI for the uni￿ed bounds: P[" 2 ("
j;CI
L ;"
j;CI
U ) for all j] = 1 ￿ P[" = 2 ("
j;CI
L ;"
j;CI
U ) for some
j] ￿ 1 ￿
PJ
j=1 P[" = 2 ("
j;CI
L ;"
j;CI
U )] ￿ 1 ￿ J ￿ 0:05=J = 0:95. Thanks to Tim Armstrong for suggesting this
approach.
274.2.1 Utility Costs of Ignoring Tax Changes
I calculate the utility costs of suboptimal choice on the extensive margin using the model in
(21) with l 2 f0;1g, so that agents can only choose whether to work or not. I follow the same
methodology as in Section 4.1.1 to calculate the utility cost of ignoring a tax change for the
marginal agent in year t ￿ 3 at each gross earnings level wi. The marginal agent at wi has
bi = wi ￿ Tt￿3(wi). The utility cost (measured as a percentage of net-of-tax earnings when
working) of choosing lt suboptimally for this agent is
￿ui;t;ext,% = jlog(wi ￿ Tt(wi)) ￿ log(wi ￿ Tt￿3(wi))j.
Earned Income Tax Credit Expansions. Figure 9 replicates Figure 5 for another important
episode in U.S. tax policy ￿the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit under the Clinton
administration. Most studies ￿nd virtually no changes in labor supply in response to EITC
expansions for individuals on the intensive margin, but ￿nd a substantial response on the
extensive margin (Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001, Eissa and Hoynes 2006). Figure 9 shows that
this pattern could be driven by frictions.
Panel A shows tax changes and utility costs on the intensive margin. The dashed blue
line shows that between 1993 and 1996, net-of-tax wage rates rose by 20% for single tax ￿lers
with two children earning below $10,000 as the phase-in subsidy was increased. Meanwhile,
net-of-tax wages fell by roughly 15% for those with incomes between $15,000 and $30,000
because of the increase in the phase-out tax rate. The solid red curve, constructed as in
Figure 5c, shows that most individuals lose less than 1% of net earnings per year by ignoring
these changes on the intensive margin. Corollary 1 implies that an observed response of b " = 0
would be consistent with " = 0:5 if one permits ￿ = 1% frictions in reoptimizing labor supply.
Panel B of Figure 9 replicates Panel A for the extensive margin. The x axis of these ￿gures
is the income that the individual would earn (wi) were he to work prior to the EITC expansion.
On the extensive margin, the relevant tax rates are average rather than marginal. The dashed
blue curve shows the change in net-of-average-tax rates (i.e., the return to working) as a result
of this reform. The solid red curve shows the utility cost of ignoring the EITC expansion for
individuals on the margin of entering the labor force at various income levels in 1993, which
coincides with the log change in the net of tax rate as shown in (17). Consider an individual
28who would earn $5,000 when working and is indi⁄erent between working and not working
in 1993, i.e. has disutility of work bi = 5000 ￿ T1993(5000). Figure 9b shows that for this
marginal individual, the gain from entering the labor force in response to the Clinton EITC
expansion is 18% of net income when working, roughly $1,000. In contrast, the gain from
reoptimizing hours on the intensive margin for a worker earning $5,000 prior to the reform is
0.7% of income, roughly $50. On the extensive margin, the agent would have lost the extra
$1,000 EITC refund if he had ignored the tax reform and stayed out of the labor force. But
on the intensive margin, a worker gets the $1,000 tax reduction even if he does not change his
hours. This could explain why individuals respond to the EITC expansion in the short run
on the extensive margin despite frictions. Indeed, Corollary 2 implies that one could observe
an elasticity of b ￿ = 0 on the extensive margin only if frictions in adjusting labor supply exceed
￿ = 9% of net-of-tax earnings when working.
Figure 6b extends this analysis to cover all tax changes from 1970-2006. In contrast to the
intensive margin results shown in Figure 6a, there are several tax changes that would generate
large utility losses (5-10% of net earnings) if ignored on the extensive margin.23 The utility
costs are particularly large for individuals who earn low incomes when working, consistent
with the literature ￿nding the largest extensive margin responses for this group.
4.2.2 Bounds on the Extensive Margin Hicksian Elasticity
Chetty et al. (2011b, Table 1) present a meta analysis of extensive margin elasticity estimates.
In Table II, I apply Proposition 2 to calculate the bounds implied by the studies they consider
with ￿ = 1% frictions.24 Panel A considers estimates from quasi-experimental studies, while
Panel B considers steady-state estimates from studies that exploit cross-sectional variation
across countries or individuals. Two results emerge from this analysis.
First, the bounds on extensive margin elasticities are much tighter than those on the
intensive margin, as shown in Figure 10. For instance, Eissa and Liebman￿ s (1996) analysis
23In these calculations, I assume that the marginal worker is in the labor force in cases where the average tax
rates rises over the three years and out of the labor force for cases where it falls. This is the relevant calculation
to determine when one would observe zero response on the extensive margin, as shown above. I exclude the
99.5 percentile from Figure 6b for scaling reasons and because few individuals enter the labor force at the 99.5
percentile of the income distribution.
24Among the studies considered by Chetty et al. (2011), I include only those that estimate steady-state
elasticities and for which I was able to compute the size of the tax change used for identi￿cation.
29of EITC expansions yields b ￿ = 0:30 and bounds on ￿ of (0:26;0:36) with ￿ = 1% frictions.25
Observed labor supply elasticities appear to provide reasonably accurate estimates of structural
elasticities on the extensive margin.
Second, the heterogeneity in extensive margin elasticities across groups cannot be at-
tributed purely to frictions. The minimum level of frictions required to reconcile the extensive
margin elasticities in Table II is ￿min = 18%. Hence, there are economically signi￿cant dif-
ferences in structural extensive margin elasticities across groups. For instance, it is plausible
that participation elasticities are especially large for low-income single mothers (Meyer and
Rosenbaum 2001). There may be similar heterogeneity in structural elasticities on the inten-
sive margin, but existing evidence is inadequate to detect such heterogeneity in the presence
of small frictions.
The results in Tables I and II challenge the commonly held view that extensive margin
elasticities are larger than intensive margin elasticities. This view underpins some important
results in modern optimal tax theory, such as providing a rationale for programs such as the
Earned Income Tax Credit (Saez 2002). The analysis here suggests that estimated intensive
margin elasticities may be smaller than extensive elasticities simply because of frictions. In
steady state, the intensive elasticity may actually be larger than extensive elasticities, reducing
the welfare gains from programs such as the EITC.
4.3 Bunching at Kinks and Non-Linear Budget Set Models
The preceding two sections have considered studies that analyze local changes in marginal tax
rates without fully modelling each agent￿ s budget set in a progressive tax system. Another
important strand of the literature on labor supply accounts for the entire tax system by
estimating non-linear budget set (NLBS) models of labor supply. Frictions can also explain
various patterns in the non-linear budget set literature.
(i) Bunching at Kinks. Frictionless NLBS models are rejected by the data because they
predict much more bunching at kinks than observed in practice. This is illustrated in Figure
11, which plots the income tax schedule in 2006 (dashed blue line) for a single ￿ler with two
children. The solid grey curve shows the income distribution predicted by the frictionless
25The level of frictions may di⁄er on the extensive and intensive margins. However, frictions would have to
be 10 times larger on the extensive margin in order to generate the same impacts as on the intensive margin.
30model in (21) when " = 0:5 and tastes ai are uniformly distributed. The frictionless model
predicts sharp spikes (mass points) at each kink in a kernel density plot of the income distri-
bution. However, empirical income distributions for wage earners exhibit no such bunching
at kinks (Saez 2010). Small frictions in choosing labor supply can explain why bunching is
not more prevalent. The number next to each convex kink in Figure 11 shows the utility
gain as a percentage of consumption (calculated using the utility in (21) from locating at that
kink point relative to optimizing under the incorrect assumption that the rate in the previous
bracket continues into the next bracket.26 The utility losses are less than 1% of net earnings
at most of the kinks.
The traditional solutions used to deal with the lack of bunching at kinks when ￿tting NLBS
models are to introduce optimization errors that smooth the income distribution around the
kink (e.g. Hausman 1981, Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz 1990) or to smooth the budget
set itself (MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsche 1990). The approach proposed here ￿permitting
agents to deviate systematically from their frictionless optima provided that the utility losses
fall below some threshold ￿places more structure on the nature of these optimization errors
and could thereby improve identi￿cation.
(ii) Bunching among the Self-Employed. Saez (2010) documents that unlike wage earners,
self-employed individuals bunch at the ￿rst kink of the EITC schedule, where tax refunds
are maximized. Audit studies show that self employment income is frequently misreported
on tax returns because of the lack of double reporting. Unlike changing actual hours of
work, misreporting generates a ￿rst-order utility gain because it transfers resources from the
government to the taxpayer. The large utility gains from misreporting taxable income could
explain why the self-employed overcome frictions and bunch at this kink.27
(iii) Notches. Unlike kinks, notches in budget sets, where a $1 change in earnings leads to a
discontinuous jump in consumption, generate substantial behavioral responses. For example,
income cuto⁄s to qualify for Medicaid (Yelowitz 1995) and social security bene￿ts in some
pension systems (Gruber and Wise 1999) induce sharp reductions in labor supply. To calculate
26There are many values of ai that can induce individuals to locate at each kink. The numbers in the ￿gure
are (unweighted) mean percentage losses for agents who would optimally locate at the kink.
27Even the self-employed do not bunch at the second kink of the EITC schedule (where the phase-out region
begins). The ￿rst kink in the EITC schedule maximizes the size of the EITC refund while minimizing payroll
tax liabilities. There is no reason to locate at the second kink if one￿ s goal is to reap ￿rst-order gains from
income manipulation.
31the utility cost of ignoring a notch, suppose that earning wlt > K triggers a penalty of P.
Then the utility cost of setting lt > K=w for an individual with l￿
t ￿ K=w exceeds P. Because
the utility cost of ignoring a notch increases at a ￿rst-order rate with the size of the penalty
P, notches a⁄ect observed behavior substantially even with frictions. Notches are therefore a
promising source of variation for identi￿cation of structural elasticities.
4.4 Micro vs. Macro Elasticities
The ￿nal strand of the literature I consider is the debate on micro vs. macro labor supply
elasticities. Macroeconomic models calibrate labor supply elasticities to match the variation in
aggregate hours of work across countries with di⁄erent tax systems or over the business cycle.
In both cases, macro calibrations of representative agent models imply larger elasticities than
microeconometric estimates of intensive margin elasticities. Can frictions explain this gap?
The macro literature uses the term ￿macro elasticity￿to refer to the Frisch elasticity of
aggregate hours and ￿micro elasticity￿to refer to the intensive-margin elasticity of hours con-
ditional on employment (e.g. Prescott 2004, Rogerson and Wallenius 2009). I instead use the
terms ￿micro￿and ￿macro￿to refer to the source of variation used to estimate the elasticity, for
two reasons. First, both intensive and extensive margin responses are determined by micro-
economic household-level choices. Second, the Frisch (marginal utility constant) elasticity is
important for understanding business cycle ￿ uctuations, but does not control the steady-state
impacts of di⁄erences in taxes across countries. The Frisch elasticity determines intertemporal
substitution responses to temporary wage ￿ uctuations, while the Hicksian (wealth constant)
elasticity controls steady-state responses and the e¢ ciency costs of taxes (MaCurdy 1981,
Auerbach 1985).28 I ￿rst compare micro and macro estimates of Hicksian elasticities and
then turn to Frisch elasticities.
Cross-Country Evidence and Hicksian Elasticities. The mean estimate of the intensive
margin Hicksian elasticity from the two macroeconomic studies in Table I (Prescott 2004,
Davis and Henrekson 2005) is 0.33.29 The mean estimate of the extensive margin Hicksian
28Chetty et al. (2011b) discuss these elasticity concepts in greater detail and show that some discrepancies
across studies arise simply from di⁄erences in terminology.
29The well known elasticity of 3 reported by Prescott (2004) is a Frisch elasticity. Regressing log hours on
log net-of-tax rates using Prescott￿ s data yields a Hicksian aggregate hours elasticity of 0.7 and an intensive
elasticity of 0.46. Prescott translates the Hicksian elasticity of 0.7 into a Frisch elasticity of 3 based on speci￿c
functional form assumptions about utility.
32elasticity from the three macroeconomic studies in Table II (Nickell 2003, Prescott 2004, Davis
and Henrekson 2005) is 0.17. Hence, macro cross-country evidence implies an aggregate hours
elasticity of 0:33 + 0:17 = 0:5:
These macro elasticity estimates are consistent with micro estimates once one accounts
for optimization frictions. On the intensive margin, even the smallest estimates in Table I
are consistent with a structural elasticity of 0.33 with ￿ = 1% frictions. The minimum-￿
micro estimate of " = 0:33 coincides exactly with the macro intensive elasticity. Intuitively,
macroeconomic comparisons are more likely to overcome frictions because they analyze steady-
state behavior and because they induce coordinated changes in work patterns (Altonji and
Oldham 2003, Chetty et al. 2011a).
On the extensive margin, the observed micro estimates in Panel A of Table II are similar
to the macro and cross-sectional estimates in Panel B even without accounting for frictions.
The mean micro estimate of ￿ is 0:25. The similarity between micro and macro estimates of
extensive margin elasticities is consistent with the prediction that frictions have little impact
on extensive margin responses.
I conclude that both micro and macro evidence imply steady-state aggregate hours elas-
ticities of approximately 0:5 once one accounts for frictions and indivisible labor. Indivisible
labor models show that both intensive and extensive margins are important in accounting for
aggregate hours di⁄erences (Rogerson 1988, Ljungvist and Sargent 2006, Rogerson and Walle-
nius 2009). Frictions explain why micro estimates of steady-state elasticities are smaller than
macro estimates on the intensive margin but are similar on the extensive margin.
Intertemporal Substitution and Frisch Elasticities. Equilibrium macro models ￿in which
￿ uctuations in labor supply are driven by preferences ￿require intensive margin Frisch elastic-
ities of about 0:5 and extensive margin Frisch elasticities above 2 to ￿t observed ￿ uctuations
in employment and hours over the business cycle (Chetty et al. 2011b). The analysis in
the present paper does not directly tell us whether micro evidence is consistent with these
values because it bounds the Hicksian rather than the Frisch elasticity. Chetty et al. (2011b)
summarize micro estimates of the Frisch elasticity. Here, I instead show that one can obtain
tight bounds on the structural intensive margin Frisch elasticity from the estimated structural
Hicksian elasticity of " = 0:33.
In the lifecycle labor supply model in (19), the intensive margin Frisch elasticity "F is re-
33lated to the intensive margin Hicksian elasticity by the following equation (Ziliak and Kniesner
1999, Browning 2005):
"F = " + ￿(
d[wl￿
i;t]
dYi;t
)2 Ai;t
wl￿
i;t
(22)
where ￿ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),
d[wl￿
i;t]
dYi;t measures the marginal
propensity to earn out of unearned income (the income e⁄ect), and
Ai;t
wl￿
i;t is the ratio of assets
to wage income. This equation implies "F > ".
One can obtain more information about "F by calibrating the other parameters in (22).
The ratio of assets to wage earnings was approximately
Ai;t
wl￿
i;t = 1:26 for the median individual
in the U.S. in 2008 (Dynan 2009, Table 1). Table III shows the values of the Frisch elasticity
implied by a Hicksian elasticity of " = 0:33 and
Ai;t
wl￿
i;t = 1:26 for various combinations of ￿ and
￿
d[wl￿
i;t]
dYi;t . To calibrate these two parameters, note that balanced growth requires that income
and substitution e⁄ects cancel, implying
d[wl￿
i;t]
dYi;t = ￿" )
d[wl￿
i;t]
dYi;t = ￿0:33. Both micro and
macro studies ￿nd an EIS of ￿ ￿ 1 (Hall 1988, Vissing-Jorgensen 2002, Guvenen 2006). The
largest Frisch elasticity consistent with these parameters is "F = 0:47. Intuitively, the Frisch
elasticity cannot be much larger than the Hicksian elasticity for plausible values of the income
e⁄ect because "F ￿ " is proportional to the income e⁄ect squared and the ratio of assets to
earnings is not very high for most households in the U.S.
An intensive margin Frisch elasticity of 0:47 is roughly consistent with the macro evidence
on business cycle ￿ uctuations in hours of work conditional on employment.30 However, Chetty
et al. (2011b) ￿nd that ￿ uctuations in employment rates over the business cycle imply Frisch
elasticities that are an order of magnitude larger than micro estimates. Unfortunately, this
discrepancy between micro and macro estimates of the Frisch elasticity on the extensive margin
cannot be explained by optimization frictions.
5 Conclusion
There are many frictions that induce agents to deviate from the optimal choices predicted
by standard economic models. This paper has shown that the model mis-speci￿cation that
30An interesting question left for future work is whether the structural or observed elasticity is more relevant
for business cycle ￿ uctuations. If there are small ￿ uctuations in wage rates over the business cycle, the observed
elasticity (attenuated by frictions) may be the better predictor of behavioral responses. But if a small group
of individuals face very large wage shocks, then frictions may be overcome and the structural elasticity may be
more relevant.
34arises from the omission of these frictions can be handled using the tools of set identi￿cation.
Abstractly, I exchange the standard orthogonality condition on the error term for a bounded
support condition based on the utility costs of errors. I derive an analytical representation
for bounds on structural price elasticities that is a function of the observed elasticity, size of
the price change used for identi￿cation, and the degree of optimization frictions.
Applying the bounds to studies of taxation and labor supply o⁄ers a critique and synthesis
of this literature. The critique is that many microeconometric studies of labor supply are
uninformative about intensive margin elasticities because they cannot reject large values of "
with frictions of even 1% of earnings in choosing labor supply. The synthesis is that several
patterns in this literature can be reconciled by allowing for such small frictions. Combining
estimates from several studies, my preferred point estimates of structural Hicksian elasticities
are 0.33 on the intensive margin, 0.25 on the extensive margin, and roughly 0.5 for aggregate
hours. I also ￿nd that Frisch elasticities cannot be much larger than Hicksian elasticities given
plausible income e⁄ects.
Both the methodology and application in this paper could be improved in several respects
in future work. Methodologically, it is important to extend the bounds to settings beyond the
binary treatment e⁄ect estimator considered here. Natural extensions include di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence estimates and regression models that allow for continuous price variation. It would
also be interesting to explore whether the bounds can be sharpened by imposing additional
restrictions from theory, such as a requirement that agents converge to unconstrained optima
over time. In the labor supply application, it would be useful to calculate bounds in modern
structural models of labor supply that incorporate factors such as human capital accumulation,
credit constraints, and uncertainty. Because full identi￿cation of these models is challenging,
bounding the structural elasticity may be a particularly fruitful approach in such cases.
Finally, the bounding methodology developed here can be applied to estimate a variety
of other critical parameters such as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the marginal
propensity to consume out of income, or the e⁄ects of the minimum wage on employment.
Such analyses would shed light on which disagreements are economically signi￿cant and which
can be reconciled simply by allowing for small frictions.
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39Appendix A: Theoretical Derivations
(i) Bounds on Intensive Margin Elasticities with Income E⁄ects and Stochastic Prices
This section establishes two results. First, the bounds in Proposition 1 apply to the
Hicksian elasticity when the quasilinearity assumption in (2) is relaxed. Second, allowing for
stochastic prices pt does not a⁄ect the bounds. To simplify notation, I ignore heterogeneity
across agents and assume all agents have a ￿ ow utility function v(xt;yt). Heterogeneity does
not a⁄ect the result under the assumption that the structural elasticity does not vary locally
across agents, as discussed below.
Let Et denote the conditional expectation operator over prices given information available
in period t and p = (p1;:::;pT) the realized price vector. To account for stochastic prices, I
rede￿ne the nominal model so that the agent maximizes expected lifetime utility
Et
T X
s=t
v(xs;ys) (23)
subject to the dynamic budget constraint Zt+1 = Zt ￿ ptxt ￿ yt and the terminal condition
ZT+1 = 0.
Let Vt(p;Zt) =
PT
s=t v(xs(p);ys(p)) denote the utility the agent attains from periods t
to T with a realized price vector of p and wealth Zt. Following Helms (1985), I de￿ne the
agent￿ s expenditure function with stochastic prices as the minimum wealth required to attain
expected utility above a given threshold U. The agent￿ s partial expenditure function (on all
other goods) conditional on consuming e xt units of good xt in period t is
e e(e xt;U) = min
Z
Z ￿ pte xt s.t. EtVt(p;Z) ￿ U and xt = e xt
and hence the total expenditure function can be written as
E(pt;U) = min
xt
ptxt + e e(xt). (24)
Let the expenditure-minimizing choice of xt be denoted by x
c;￿
t (pt;Ut), the structural Hicksian
demand function under the nominal model in (23). Let xc
t(pt;Ut) denote the observed Hicksian
demand function with frictions. Let "(pt) = ￿@xc;￿
@pt
pt
xc denote the structural Hicksian price
elasticity of demand at price pt. When utility is not quasilinear, identifying "(pt) requires
variation in prices within period t because price changes across periods con￿ ate the Frisch and
Hicksian elasticities (MaCurdy 1981). Consider an experiment in which some agents face a
price of pA and others face a price of pB in period t and let
b "(pA;pB) = ￿
logxc
B(pB) ￿ logxc
A(pA)
log(pB) ￿ log(pA)
denote the observed elasticity from this experiment. Our objective is to identify "(pt) from
estimates of b " in an environment with frictions.
In this setting, the ￿ class of models is de￿ned by the condition:
[ptxc
t + e e(xc
t)] ￿ [ptx
c;￿
t + e e(x
c;￿
t )] ￿ ￿ptx
c;￿
t (25)
40I ￿rst establish an analog of Lemma 1 to characterize the choice set with frictions.
Lemma A1. For small ￿, the set of observed Hicksian demands is approximately
Xc
t(pt;￿) = fxc
t : jlogxc
t ￿ logx
c;￿
t j ￿ [2"(pt)￿]1=2g (26)
Proof. The ￿rst order condition for (24) is
e ex(x
c;￿
t ) = ￿pt (27)
Using a quadratic approximation to the partial expenditure function, we can exploit this ￿rst
order condition to obtain
[ptxc
t + e e(xc
t)] ￿ [ptx
c;￿
t + e e(x
c;￿
t )] ’
1
2
(x
c;￿
t )2(logxc
t ￿ logx
c;￿
t )2e exx(x
c;￿
t )
and hence we can rewrite (25) as
jlogxc
t ￿ logx
c;￿
t j ￿ [2￿
pt
x
c;￿
t
1
e exx(x
c;￿
t )
]1=2 (28)
Di⁄erentiating (27) with respect to pt implies 1=e exx(x
c;￿
t ) = ￿@xc;￿
@pt and substituting this equa-
tion into (28) completes the proof.
Next, I establish the analog of Proposition 1. When utility is not quasilinear, the structural
elasticity "(pt) varies with the price pt. Let "(pA) and "(pB) denote the structural point
elasticities at the initial and ￿nal prices and "(pA;pB) = ￿
logx
c;￿
B (pB)￿logx
c;￿
A (pA)
log(pB)￿log(pA) denote the
structural arc elasticity between the two prices. Then the upper bound on "(pA;pB) is
characterized by an equation analogous to (12):
b "(pA;pB) = ￿
logxc
B(pB) ￿ logxc
A(pA)
log(pB) ￿ log(pA)
= "(pA;pB) ￿
2(2"(pB)￿)1=2
￿logp
Solving this equation requires a parametric assumption about utility to relate the two point
elasticities at pA and pB to the arc elasticity. I make the following local iso-elasticity assump-
tion, which is analogous to assumption A2 in the extensive margin case.
A2￿The structural Hicksian elasticity is constant between pA and pB: "(pt) = ￿@xc;￿
@pt
pt
xc;￿ =
"(pA;pB) for pt 2 [pA;pB]
Under A2￿ , the upper and lower bounds on the structural arc elasticity "(pA;pB) are
characterized by the same equations as (12) and (13):
b " = " ￿ 2
(2"￿)1=2
￿logp
Proposition A1. Under assumption A2￿ , for small ￿, the range of structural Hicksian elas-
ticities "(pA;pB) consistent with an observed Hicksian elasticity b "(pA;pB) is approximately
41("L;"U) where
"L = b " +
4￿
(￿logp)2(1 ￿ ￿) and "U = b " +
4￿
(￿logp)2(1 + ￿)
with ￿ = (1 +
1
2
b "(pt)
￿
(￿logp)2)1=2
Proof. Identical to the proof of Proposition 1.
In a model with heterogeneous utilities vi(xs;ys), Proposition A1 requires a stronger iso-
elasticity assumption, namely that the structural elasticity "(pt) does not vary across agents
between pA and pB. It also requires an assumption analogous to A1, i.e. that tastes are
orthogonal to the price change used for identi￿cation.
(ii) Bounds on Extensive Margin Elasticities
With quasilinear utility, the agent￿ s ￿ ow utility in period t is vi;t(x;y) = y +bi;tx. Recog-
nizing that the consumption path of y does not a⁄ect lifetime utility, the ￿ ow utility cost of
choosing x suboptimally in period t is
ui;t(x￿(pt)) ￿ ui;t(x) = (x￿
i;t ￿ x)(bi;t ￿ pt)
I de￿ne a ￿ class of models around the nominal model by a condition analogous to (7):
(x￿
i;t ￿ x)(bi;t ￿ pt) ￿ ￿ipt and
1
N
P
i ￿i;t ￿ ￿ and F(bi;tj￿i;t) = F(bi;t) (29)
The last condition in (29) ￿that the taste distribution cannot vary across agents with di⁄erent
frictions ￿is needed to ensure that the choice set has the same width for the marginal agents
at each level of p.31 This condition was not necessary in the intensive margin case because
the marginal agent did not vary with p there.
Proof of Lemma 2. Equation (29) implies that agent i￿ s observed demand for x is
xi;t =
8
<
:
1 if bi;t ￿ pt > ￿i;tpt
f0;1g if jbi;t ￿ ptj ￿ ￿i;tpt
0 if bi;t ￿ pt < ￿￿i;tpt
Let ￿￿i;t(pt) denote the observed participation rate for agents who have frictions ￿i;t and
￿t = E￿￿i;t(pt) denote the observed participation rate in the aggregate economy. Under
the condition that F(bi;tj￿i;t) = F(bi;t), it follows that ￿￿i;t(pt) lies in the set:
[1 ￿ F((1 + ￿i;t)pt);1 ￿ F((1 ￿ ￿i;t)pt)]
= [￿￿
t + F(pt) ￿ F((1 + ￿i;t)pt);￿￿
t + F(pt) ￿ F((1 ￿ ￿i;t)pt)]
’ [￿￿
t ￿ f(pt)pt￿i;t;￿￿
t + f(pt)pt￿i;t)]
31To see why this condition is needed, suppose agents with bi;t close to pt have very large ￿i;t while those
away from the margin have ￿i;t = 0. This would result in a wide choice set for the participation rate at pt even
if E￿i;t < ￿.
42where the last line uses a ￿rst-order Taylor expansion of F(pt) around pt. Under A1￿and A2￿ ,
￿ = ￿
dlog[1￿F(pt)]
dlogpt =
f(pt)
￿￿(pt)pt. Hence
￿￿i;t(pt) 2 [￿￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿i;t);￿￿
t ￿ (1 + ￿￿i;t)]
) E￿￿i;t(pt) 2 [￿￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿E￿i;t);￿￿
t ￿ (1 + ￿E￿i;t)]
) ￿t(pt)=￿￿
t(pt) 2 [1 ￿ ￿￿;1 + ￿￿]
The approximation log(1 + ￿￿) ’ ￿￿ for small ￿ yields jlog￿t ￿ log￿￿
tj ￿ ￿￿.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given a structural elasticity ￿, the maximal observed response to
a price change of ￿logp is ￿log￿ = ￿￿logp + 2￿￿ and the minimal observed response is
￿log￿ = ￿￿logp ￿ 2￿￿. Therefore the observed elasticity b ￿ =
￿log￿
￿logp must satisfy
(1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ ￿ b ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿￿)￿ (30)
where ￿￿ = 2￿
￿logp. If ￿￿ ￿ 1, ￿ is unbounded above for a given value of b ￿ because both
inequalities in (30) are satis￿ed for arbitrarily large ￿. If 2￿
￿logp < 1, then the upper and lower
bounds on ￿ are obtained when (30) holds with equality. Solving these equations yields (16).
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose b ￿ = 0. Then ￿￿ < 1 ) ￿U = 0. Hence a positive structural
elasticity (￿ > 0) can only generate a 0 observed elasticity if ￿￿ = 2￿
￿logp ￿ 1 , ￿uext;% =
￿logp ￿ 2￿.
(iii) Intuition for 4￿ threshold in Corollary 1
This section explains why ￿u%(") must be below 4￿ in order to observe b " = 0. Let
d = x￿
A(pA)￿min(XA(pA;￿)) denote the di⁄erence between the mean optimal demand and the
lowest mean demand in the initial choice set. Figure (a) below shows that at the upper bound
"U, the di⁄erence between the optimal demands at the two prices is x￿(pA) ￿ x￿(pB) = 2d.
By de￿nition, the percentage utility cost of choosing min(XA(pA;￿)) instead of x￿(pA) is ￿.
Given that the utility cost of deviating by d units is ￿, the utility cost of deviating by 2d units
is 4￿, as illustrated in Figure (b).
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43Appendix B: Sources and Calculations for Studies in Table I
This appendix describes how the values in columns 3-5 Table I are calculated. The papers
used for the analysis along with comprehensive documentation of the calculations are available
at http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/bounds_opt_meta_analysis.zip
I use compensated intensive margin estimates reported in each paper when available and
use the Slutsky equation to calculate compensated elasticities in cases where uncompensated
elasticities are reported.
The studies do not always directly report the relevant inputs, especially the net-of-tax
change ￿log(1￿￿). For studies whose estimates are identi￿ed from a single quasi-experiment
(e.g. Feldstein 1995), I de￿ne ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) as the change in the marginal NTR for the group
that the authors￿de￿ne as the ￿treated￿ group. For studies that pool multiple tax or wage
changes of di⁄erent sizes and do not explicitly isolate a treatment group (e.g. Gruber and
Saez 2002), I de￿ne ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) as twice the standard deviation of ￿log(1 ￿ MTR) in the
sample. The logic for this approach is as follows. In a linear regression Yi = ￿ + ￿1Xi + ui,
the standard error of ^ ￿1 is the square root of (var(u)=var(X))=N where N is the sample
size. Consider a second regression Yi = ￿ + ￿2Zi + ui, where Zi = 0 for half the observations
(the ￿control group￿ ) and Zi = 2 ￿ SD(X) for the remaining observations (the ￿treatment
group￿ ). Setting the size of the single treatment to 2 ￿ SD(X) yields var(Z) = var(X).
Hence, the standard error of ^ ￿2 equals the standard error of ^ ￿1. A single tax change of
2 ￿ SD(￿log(1 ￿ MTR)) therefore produces an estimate of b " with the same precision as the
original variation in marginal tax rates used for identi￿cation.
I calculate the bounds by assuming that agents face a linear budget set whose slope is
given by their marginal tax rate (MTR) and apply Proposition A1 using ￿log(1￿MTR) in
place of ￿logp. This yields valid bounds on " for agents who remain in the interior of budget
segments in a progressive tax system. However, the bounds cannot be applied to agents who
locate at kinks. Given that most of the studies in Table I estimate elasticities from changes
in the behavior of agents away from kinks, this is not a serious limitation.32
The remainder of the appendix describes how I calculate b ", the standard error of b ", and
￿log(1 ￿ MTR) for each study in Table I.
A. Hours Elasticities
1. MaCurdy (1981): b ": reported in text on page 1083. s.e.(b "): imputed from the t-statistic
for ￿ reported in row 5 of Table 1 as 0:15=0:98 because the estimate of compensated elasticity
is approximately equal to ￿. ￿log(1￿￿): the relevant within-person annual wage variation is
not reported in the paper, so I use 2￿SD = 2￿(0:1522 +2￿0:0862)1=2 from Table 1, column
4 of Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) who estimate the standard deviation of changes in log
wages. Note that this is likely an overestimate of the size of ￿log(1￿￿), resulting in bounds
that are too tight, because MaCurdy uses family background characteristics, age, and year
dummies as instruments for wage growth and does not use all elements of wage growth for
identi￿cation.
32Recent studies that identify observed elasticities from bunching at kinks (e.g. Saez 2009, Chetty et al. 2011)
are an exception. I incorporate these studies into the linear-demand framework by exploiting the fact that
they also study movements in the kinks over time, which create reductions in marginal rates for the subgroup
of individuals located between the old and new bracket cuto⁄s. These studies imply that these individuals do
not increase labor supply signi￿cantly when their marginal tax rates are lowered. This constitutes an observed
elasticity estimate based on choices at interior optima, permitting application of Proposition 1.
442,3. Eissa and Hoynes (1998): b ": authors report for men an intensive margin￿wage elas-
ticity￿of 0:07 and an income elasticity of ￿0:03 in Table 8, col. 3. This ￿wage elasticity￿
uses the total hours change, which includes the hours change induced by the increased EITC
rebate, which raised the average net of tax rate by 0.042 for a couple earning $15,000 with
two children (for whom the average net-of-tax rate changed from 107.5% in 1993 to 112.1%
in 1994 computed using TAXSIM). This rebate should have changed hours (in log terms) by
￿0:03 ￿ 0:042, giving an uncompensated elasticity of 0:069. The compensated elasticity is
b "men
lc;w = b "l;w ￿ wl
y b "l;y = 0:200, with w, l, and y from Table 3, column 4. A parallel calculation
using Table 9 gives b "women
lc;w = 0:088. s.e.(b "): assume that w, l, y and the change in income
from the EITC expansion are measured without error. Then, using the t-statistics from the
coe¢ cients on ln(wage) and virtual inc to impute the standard errors for the elasticities, yields
SE(b "men
lc;w) = fSE(b "l;w)2 + [wl
y SE(b "l;y)]2g1=2 = 0:074 and SE(b "women
lc;w ) = 0:067. Note that this
calculation is limited because the full variance-covariance matrix for the regression coe¢ cients
is not reported. ￿log(1￿￿): de￿ned as 2￿SD of log net-of-tax-rate in the phase out EITC
rates listed in Table 1 for 1984￿ 96 because most married couples that receive the EITC are in
the phase-out region (Table 2).
4. Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 4, row 1. I interpret this estimate
as an intensive margin elasticity because the variation in wages from the grouping estimator
does not appear to a⁄ect participation, based on the discussion on page 845. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿):
de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD(log b wgt ￿ log b wg ￿ log b wt) = 0:23 reported in Table 9 because the variation
arises from group-time interactions in wages.
5. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 1, column 3. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): the study
e⁄ectively uses within-person annual wage variation because lagged wage growth is included
as an instrument. Since within-person annual wage variation is not reported in the paper, I
again use 2 ￿ SD = 2 ￿ (0:1522 + 2 ￿ 0:0862)1=2 from Table 1, column 4 of Low, Meghir and
Pistaferri (2010).
B. Taxable Income Elasticities
6. Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega (2001): b ", s.e.(b "): average percent change in earnings
for men and women weighted by observations (columns 1￿ 4 of Table 6) divided by the percent
change in the net-of-tax rate. Standard error computed from the standard errors reported for
the changes in earnings. I interpret this estimate as an intensive margin elasticity because
Table 6 conditions on work in 1986 and tax rates were generally lower in 1987 and 1988 than
in 1986. I take this to be a compensated elasticity because Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega
argue that income e⁄ects are small on page 1565￿ 6, although this is somewhat tenuous. Note
that the elasticity estimates provided by the authors are computed using average rather than
marginal tax rates, necessitating use of the computation described above. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): log
change from tax rate of 0 in 1987 to 0:3875, which is an average of the ￿ at tax in 1988 and the
mean of the top marginal tax rate and bottom marginal tax rate in 1986 reported in Table 1
because the change in earnings estimate compares 1987 to the average earnings in 1986 and
1988.
7. Gruber and Saez (2002): b ", s.e.(b "): average of the estimates in column 2 of Table 9 for
individuals with taxable income between $10,000 and $50,000 and those with taxable income
between $50,000 and $100,000. These estimates are compensated elasticities, as Gruber and
Saez note on page 20 that income e⁄ects are essentially zero in their sample. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿):
de￿ned as 2￿SD of the change in log net-of-tax-rate and computed separately for columns 3
45and 4 of Table 3 using the means and standard deviations for each year. The two estimates
of ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) are then averaged in the same way as in the elasticity calculation described
above.
8. Saez (2004): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 7B, column 6 for the top 5 to 1 percent of tax units.
Note that Saez uses gross income, not taxable income. I interpret his estimate as an intensive
margin elasticity because his sample consists of repeated cross sections of workers and because
the extensive margin is unlikely to be important for the top 5 to 1 percent of tax payers. I
interpret this estimate as a compensated elasticity following the aforementioned evidence from
Gruber and Saez (2002) that income e⁄ects are small. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of
the log net-of-tax-rate for the top 5 to 1 percent of tax units listed in column 8 of Table 5.
9. Jacob and Ludwig (2008): b ": authors report that head of households￿quarterly earnings
conditional on working changed by $228 from a control mean of $5,558 in Table 3. As with
Eissa and Hoynes, I calculate how much income would have changed absent the grant worth
$6,860 (page 9) in order to compute a compensated wage elasticity. Jacob and Ludwig do not
report the e⁄ect of unearned income on earnings, so I use an estimate from Imbens, Rubin,
and Sacerdote (2001), who report in Table 4, speci￿cation V, col. 1 a marginal propensity to
earn out of unearned income (MPE) of -0.114 with a standard error of 0.015. In an earlier
version, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (1999) reported earnings and participation elasticities
of ￿around￿-0.20 and -0.14 respectively, so I assume an intensive MPE of
d[wl]
dY = ￿0:114f1 ￿
(0:14=0:20)g = ￿0:034. On a quarterly basis, the grant should have lowered earnings by
￿0:034￿(6860=4) = 58:65. Dividing the change in earnings absent the grant by the tax change
gives an uncompensated elasticity of flog(5558 ￿ 228 + 58:65) ￿ log(5558)g=flog(1) ￿ log(1 ￿
0:3)g = 0:086. Finally, the elasticity is b " = b "u ￿
d[wl]
dY = 0:086 + 0:034 = 0:121. s.e.(b "):
Assuming that the standard error on the intensive MPE is proportional to the error on the
total MPE, and that the change in income due to the grant is measured without error, then
the standard error is 0:031. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): MTR changed from 0 to 0.30 for those receiving
the housing voucher as described in footnote 29 so that log(1) ￿ log(1 ￿ 0:3) = 0:36.
10, 11. Gelber (2010): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 3, column 1 for men and column 2 for women.
These estimates use earned income since it is less susceptible to manipulation than taxable
labor income. These estimates presumably re￿ ect primarily intensive margin responses since
the extensive margin is unlikely to be important for the high income group a⁄ected by the
change in top bracket tax rates. ￿log(1￿￿): percent change in net-of-tax rate from 1989 to
1991 for the highest tax brackets reported in Table 1.
12. Saez (2010): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 2, row 1 of column 6 for wage earners with two or more
children. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): change in NTR at ￿rst kink in the EITC bene￿t schedule from 1995
to 2004.
13, 14. Chetty et al. (2011a): b ", s.e.(b "): observed elasticities at middle and top kinks,
calculated using equation 6 in Chetty et al. (2011a) as b=K￿log(1 ￿ ￿). In this equation,
K is the location of the tax bracket cuto⁄ (DKr 164,300 for the middle tax and DKr 267,600
for the top tax). The estimated excess mass at the kink (b) is 1.79 (s.e. 0.05) for married
women at the top kink (Figure IIIb) and 0.06 (s.e. 0.03) at the middle kink (Figure VIa).
￿log(1 ￿ ￿): size of tax changes at the middle and top tax kinks as reported in Figure II.
15. Chetty et al. (2011a): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 2, col 1. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of
the changes in the log net-of-tax rate reported in the last row of Table 1, col 1.
C. Top Income Elasticities
4616. Feldstein (1995): b ": high minus medium tax rate speci￿cation in Table 2. For this and
other studies based on TRA86, I follow the literature in interpreting elasticties as compensated
elasticities because the reform was revenue neutral (Feldstein 1999). s.e.(b "): not reported by
Feldstein (1995). For a rough estimate, rescaling the standard error cited by Feldstein on
page 566 for Auten and Carroll (1994) by the ratio of sample sizes in the two studies yields:
s.e.(b ")= 0:15
p
14425=3735 = 0:295. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): reported in Table 2 for the high tax rate
group.
17. Auten and Carroll (1999): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 2, Col 6. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): reported by
Goolsbee (1999) for the highest income group in Table 3, row C for 1985 to 1989 because
TRA86 ￿provided tax variation mostly at the top of the income scale, so that their overall
estimates are identi￿ed primarily by reactions of high income taxpayers￿ (Gruber and Saez
2002, pg 24-25).
18. Goolsbee (1999): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 4, column 1. ￿log(1￿￿): Table 3, row C for 1985
to 1989 based on the quote above.
19. Saez (2004): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 3C, column 3 for the top 1 percent of tax units. Note
that Saez uses gross income, not taxable income. I interpret his estimate as an intensive
margin elasticity because his sample consists of repeated cross sections of workers and because
the extensive margin is unlikely to be important for the top 1 percent of tax payers. I interpret
this estimate as a compensated elasticity following the aforementioned evidence from Gruber
and Saez (2002) that income e⁄ects are small. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of the log
net-of-tax-rate for the top 1 percent of tax units listed in column 3 of Table 5.
20. Kopczuk (2010): b ", s.e.(b "): Table 9, second panel, col (1), 2002-2005, with standard
error imputed from the reported t-statistic. This is a compensated elasticity following Gruber
and Saez (2002) equation 2. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): reported on page 17.
D. Macro/Cross-Sectional
21. Prescott (2004): b ", s.e.(b "): calculated by regressing log hours per worker on log net-
of-tax rates using OECD data reported by Prescott in Table 2 on hours per adult, which are
converted to hours per worker using labor force participation rates from OECD Stat Extracts.33
The data on labor force participation rates are missing for Canada and the U.K. in the 1970￿ s
and these observations are therefore excluded. The elasticity estimate can be interpreted as a
compensated labor supply elasticity if government expenditure is viewed as unearned income
in the aggregate. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of the change in log net-of-tax rate for the
12 observations with non-missing data on hours per employed person.
22. Davis and Henrekson (2005): b ": computed using log di⁄erences in annual hours per
employed adult based on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 2.3 (middle panel, Sample C) and
the sample means of annual hours per employed person and tax rates in Table 2.1 for the
corresponding sample. The elasticity estimate can be interpreted as a compensated labor
supply elasticity if government expenditure is viewed as unearned income in the aggregate.
s.e.(b "): calculated from the standard error reported for the slope coe¢ cient in Table 2.3 (middle
panel, Sample C). ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): computed as 2 ￿ SD of log one minus sum of tax rates for
the 19 countries in Sample C.34
33Data are for men and women aged 15-64 for 1970-1974 and 1993-1996 in order to
match Prescott￿ s data. Data are available from OECD Stat Extracts at the following URL:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R
34Data are for 1995 for all countries except New Zeland and Australia for which I use 1986 and 1985 values
4723. Blau and Kahn (2007): b ": computed from intensive margin (with selection correction)
elasticities reported in Table 6, de￿ning the income elasticity as the elasticity of women￿ s hours
with respect to husband￿ s wages and using the Slutsky equation to compute compensated
elasticities in corresponding fashion. Mean values of wl and y are from Table A2 and A3.
I report an unweighted average of the elasticities from Model 1 for each of the three time
periods. s.e.(b "): calculated from the standard error reported for the regression coe¢ cients in
Table 7 of NBER Working Paper 11230. I assume that the covariance between the coe¢ cient
estimates is zero because the full variance-covariance matrix for the regression coe¢ cients is
not reported. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of log wage rates because the study e⁄ectively
exploits cross-sectional variation in wage rates for identi￿cation; the instruments used in Table
6 correct only for measurement error. The standard deviation of log wages for married women
is not reported, and is therefore taken from Rothstein (2008), who reports a value of 0:50 in col.
4 of Table 1 for married women in 1992/3. This estimate is consistent with other published
estimates of the standard deviations of women￿ s log wages in the CPS (e.g., Blau and Kahn
2000, Card and DiNardo 2002).
Appendix C: Sources and Calculations for Extensive Margin Studies in Table II
This appendix describes the sources of the values in Columns 3-5 of Table II for each study.
For studies 1-7, the elasticity estimates (b ￿) and standard errors in columns 3￿ 4 are taken from
Table 1 in Chetty et al. (2011b), and details on the sources of these estimates are given in
Appendix B of that paper. Studies 8-10 are also from Chetty et al. (2011b) and details on
these estimates can be found in Appendix C of that paper. I follow the same methods as in
Appendix B to calculate ￿log(1￿￿), de￿ned here as the change in the net-of-average tax rate.
The papers used for the analysis along with comprehensive documentation of the calculations
are available at:
http://obs.rc.fas.harvard.edu/chetty/bounds_opt_meta_analysis.zip
A. Quasi-Experimental Elasticities
1. Eissa and Liebman (1996): ￿log(1￿￿): Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) use the same data
source and in Table 2 calculate the ￿nancial gain from working for single mothers in 1990 as
$8,458, compared with $7,469 in 1984. I therefore de￿ne ￿log(1￿￿) = log(8458)￿log(7469).
2. Graversen (1998): ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): Table 3 reports level changes in employment rates and
participation elasticities, from which I back out ￿log(1￿￿) = (￿￿=￿)=b ￿, where ￿￿ = ￿0:031
is the estimated change in employment rates for single women, ￿ = 0:7 is the mean employment
rate for single women using an average of the six participation rates in Table 2 weighted by
sample sizes, and b ￿ = ￿0:174 is the elasticity estimate reported in Table 3.
3. Devereux (2004): ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of the deviations from the mean log
wage change for each region/age/education group in Table A1 for women because the variation
used for identi￿cation is across region and time by education/age group. Note that this table
conditions on some work whereas in the sample used to estimate b ￿, nonparticipants￿wages are
imputed as the average for their group.
following Davis and Henrekson￿ s data appendix. Austria is excluded because Davis and Henrekson exclude it
from Sample C. The variable of interest in the data set is tw which stands for ￿tax wedge.￿ See Davis and
Henrekson for more details. The mean (0:496 vs. 0:500) and standard deviation (0:14 vs. 0:133) reported for
Sample C in Table 2.1 di⁄ers slightly from those used in this calculation. The data were accessed from the .zip
appendix at the following URL: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/number.asp?number=502
484. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001): ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): see discussion of study 4 in Chetty et al.
(2011b), who de￿ne ￿log(1 ￿ ￿) = 45% after accounting for taxes and transfers as in Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2000, pg. 1043).
5. Eissa and Hoynes (2004): ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000, pg. 1043) report
a tax change of 45% from 1984 to 1996 for the group studied by Eissa and Hoynes.
6. Liebman and Saez (2006) :￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as log(1 ￿ 0:419) ￿ log(1 ￿ 0:31) based
on the change in tax rates reported on pages 10￿ 11 for OBRA93.
7. Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2011): ￿log(1￿￿): de￿ned as 2￿SD of log net-of-tax-
rates for participation. Standard deviation of 0:37 obtained from personal correspondence
with authors.
B. Macro/Cross-Sectional Elasticities
8. Nickell (2003): b ￿: computed using the average point estimate of 2 percent (reported
on page 8) and the sample means of employment rates and tax rates from Tables 1 and 2,
respectively. s.e.(b ￿): not reported because Nickell does not report standard errors for the
studies in Table 4 on which his point estimate is based. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of
log net-of-tax-rates using values listed in Table 2 because most of the studies in Table 4 used
in Nickell￿ s estimate of the e⁄ect of taxation on employment use panel or cross sectional data
for OECD countries.
9. Prescott (2004): b ￿, s.e.(b ￿): calculated by regressing log labor force participation rates
from OECD Stat Extracts on log net-of-tax rates using the same sample of countries and years
as Prescott.35 The data on tax rates is taken from Table 2 of Prescott (2004). The data on
labor force participation rates are missing for Canada and the U.K. in the 1970￿ s and these
observations are therefore excluded. ￿log(1 ￿ ￿): de￿ned as 2 ￿ SD of the change in log
net-of-tax rate for the 12 observations with non-missing data on labor force participation rates.
10. Davis and Henrekson (2005): b ￿: computed using the log di⁄erence in employment
based on the slope coe¢ cient in Table 2.3 (bottom panel, Sample C) and the sample means
of labor force participation and tax rates in Table 1 for the corresponding sample. s.e.(b ￿):
calculated from the standard error reported for the slope coe¢ cient in Table 2.3 (bottom
panel, Sample C). ￿log(1￿￿): computed as 2￿SD of log one minus sum of tax rates for the
19 countries in Sample C.
11. Blau and Kahn (2007): b ￿: I report an unweighted average of the own wage participation
elasticities for each of the three time periods in Table 6, Model 1. s.e.(b ￿): The standard error
is calculated from the standard error reported for own log wage in Table 7 of NBER Working
Paper 11230. I assume that the covariance between the coe¢ cient estimates is zero because
the full variance-covariance matrix for the parameters in the probit model is not reported.
￿log(1￿￿): de￿ned as 2￿SD of log wages, calculated as described in study 23 in Appendix
B above.
35Data are for men and women aged 15-64 for 1970-1974 and 1993-1996 in order to
match Prescott￿ s data. Data are available from OECD Stat Extracts at the following URL:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R
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NOTE–This figure illustrates the choice set Xpt, in a  class of models when there is no heterogeneity across agents and
  1% and ai,t a  exp3.5. The blue curve plots flow utility uxt  100 − ptxtalogxt with logpt 1. The set of
demand levels that yield utility within 0.01ptx∗pt dollars of the maximum is shown by the red interval on the x axis.FIGURE 2
Identification with Optimization Frictions
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NOTE–This figure plots the choice sets at two price levels, XpA, and XpB,, with logpA 1 and logpB 1.2. In
Panel A,   1; in Panel B,   0. All other parameters are specified as in Figure 1. The dashed blue line shows the
optimal demand x∗pt. The black lines in Panel A illustrate some of the responses (logxBpB − logxApA) that may be
observed for a price increase from pA to pB with a structural elasticity of   1 and frictions of   1% .FIGURE 3
Bounding the Structural Elasticity with Optimization Frictions
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a) Upper Bound on Structural Elasticity
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b) Lower Bound on Structural Elasticity
NOTE–The solid black line in each panel depicts the observed demand response for a price increase from pA to pB with an
observed elasticity  ̂  0.3, logpA 1, and logpB 1.4. Panel A depicts the highest structural elasticity, U 1, that
could have generated this observed response with   1%. The dashed blue line depicts the optimal demand x∗pt with
  1. Panel B analogously depicts the lowest structural elasticity, L 0.1, that could have generated the same observed
response.FIGURE 4
Bounds on Structural Elasticities as a Function of Observed Elasticities
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NOTE–The dashed (red) lines show the bounds on the intensive margin structural elasticity L,U vs. the observed
intensive margin elasticity  ̂, computed using Proposition 1. The dotted (blue) lines show the bounds on the extensive
margin structural elasticity L,U vs. the observed extensive margin elasticity  , computed using Proposition 2. The
solid black line is the 45 degree line. The bounds are computed with   1% frictions and Δlogp  20% (Panel A) and
Δlogp  40% (Panel B).FIGURE 5
Tax Reform Act of 1986
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c) Utility Cost of Ignoring Tax Change (% of net earnings)
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NOTE–These figures are based on the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The x axis in all the figures is gross earnings in the year
prior to the reform. Panel A shows how marginal tax rates changed between 1985 and 1988 for single filers with two
children. Panel B plots the utility cost Δui, measured in dollars, from failing to reoptimize labor supply on the intensive
margin in response to the tax change with   0.5. Panel C plots the same utility cost as a percentage of net-of-tax
earnings (Δui,%), defined as the dollar cost in Panel B divided by the agent’s optimal net-of-tax earnings in 1988. Panel D
shows the change in gross earnings (wli,1988
∗ −wli,1985
∗ ) required to reoptimize relative to the tax change. In Panels B-D, the
dashed blue line (right y axis) replicates the log change in the net-of-tax rate (1-MTR) shown in Panel A.FIGURE 6
Utility Cost of Ignoring Tax Changes by Year
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a) Intensive Margin
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NOTE–These figures plot the utility cost of ignoring changes in taxes over three-year periods from the 1970 to 2006 for
selected percentiles of the household income distribution. Panel A shows the utility cost of failing to reoptimize labor
supply on the intensive margin (Δui,t,%) with a structural intensive-margin elasticity of   0.5, calculated as in Figure 5c.
In each year y, the point that is plotted shows the utility loss (as a percentage of optimal net-of-tax earnings in year y)f r o m
choosing labor supply optimally according to the tax system in year y − 3 instead of year y. Panel B depicts the percentage
utility cost (Δui,t,ext,%) of failing to reoptimize labor supply on the extensive margin in year y for the marginal agent in year
y − 3. This is the agent whose disutility of working bi made him indifferent between working and not working in y − 3.
The utility cost Δui,t,ext,% is measured as a percentage of net-of-tax earnings when working in year y, as in Corollary 2.FIGURE 7
Bounds on Intensive Margin Hicksian Labor Supply Elasticities with   1%
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NOTE–The red intervals show the bounds on the structural intensive margin Hicksian elasticity  implied by each of the
studies with corresponding numbers listed in Table I. The blue squares show the point estimate of each study. The x axis
is the log change in the net of tax rate (Δlog1 − ) used for identification in each study. Studies with Δlog1 −   20%
are excluded from this figure for scaling purposes. The shaded region shows the range of structural elasticities consistent
with all the observed elasticities in Panels A-D of Table I, the unified bounds of 0.47,0.51. When only studies 1-15
(Panels A and B) are used, the unified bounds are 0.28,0.54.FIGURE 8
Unified Bounds on Intensive Margin Hicksian Elasticity vs. Degree of Frictions
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NOTE–This figure shows how the unified bounds on the structural intensive-margin elasticity  vary with the level of
frictions . The solid red lines plot the unified bounds implied by the studies in Panels A and B of Table I. These unified
bounds are defined only for   min 0.5% because ’s below this threshold cannot reconcile the observed elasticities.
The dashed red lines show a 95% confidence interval for the unified bounds.FIGURE 9
Utility Costs of Ignoring the Clinton EITC Expansion
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NOTE–These figures are based on the Clinton EITC Expansion enacted between 1993 and 1996. Panel A considers the
intensive margin. The x axis is gross earnings in the year prior to the reform. The dashed blue line (right y axis) shows the
log change in the net-of-marginal-tax rate (1-MTR) from 1993-1996 for single filers with two children. The solid red line
plots the utility cost as a percentage of optimal net-of-tax earnings in 1996 (Δui,1996,%) from failing to reoptimize hours of
work in response to the tax change when   0.5. Panel B considers the extensive margin. The dashed blue line (right y
axis) shows the log change in the net-of-average-tax rate (1-ATR) from 1993-1996 for single filers with two children. The
solid red line plots the utility cost (Δui,1996,ext,%) of failing to enter the labor force in 1996 for the marginal agent who
chose not to work at each earnings level in 1993. This is this agent whose disutility of working bi made him indifferent
between working and not working in 1993 at the gross earnings level shown on the x axis. The utility cost Δui,1996,ext,% is
measured as a percentage of net-of-tax earnings when working in 1996.FIGURE 10
Bounds on Extensive Margin Labor Supply Elasticities with   1%
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NOTE–The red intervals show the bounds on the structural extensive margin elasticity  implied by each of the studies
with corresponding numbers listed in Table II. The blue squares show the point estimate of each study. The x axis is the
log change in the net of tax rate (Δlog1 − ) used for identification in each study. Papers with Δlog1 −   20% are
excluded from this figure for scaling purposes.FIGURE 11
Gains from Bunching at Kinks in 2006 Tax Schedule
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NOTE–The dashed blue curve shows the 2006 marginal tax rate schedule in the U.S. The solid grey curve shows the
distribution of taxable income predicted by the frictionless labor supply model with   0.5. This curve assumes a
uniform distribution of ai and plots an Epanechnikov kernel density of the simulated earnings distribution with a
bandwidth of $1000. The numbers near each convex kink are the utility gain as a percentage of optimal net-of-tax earnings
(Δu%) from locating at that kink when   0.5. To compute Δu% at a given kink, I first define Δui,% as the utility gain for
an individual with taste parameter ai from locating at that kink relative to optimizing under the (incorrect) assumption that
the tax rate in the previous bracket continues into the next bracket. I then define Δu% as the unweighted mean of Δui,%
over all individuals whose ai would make it optimal for them to locate at that kink. The first two kinks (1.84% and 0.71%)
correspond to the end of the phase-in and start of the phase-out regions of the EITC.Study Identification s.e. log(1-)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Hours Elasticities
1. MaCurdy (1981) Lifecycle wage variation, 1967-1976 0.15 0.15 0.39 0.03 0.80 0.04 1.20
2. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) U.S. EITC Expansions, 1984-1996, Men 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.00 15.29 0.00 15.51
3. Eissa and Hoynes (1998) U.S. EITC Expansions, 1984-1996, Women 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.00 15.07 0.00 15.30
4. Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1998) U.K. Tax Reforms, 1978-1992 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.01 1.78 0.00 2.04
5. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) Lifecycle wage, tax variation 1978-1987 0.15 0.07 0.39 0.03 0.80 0.00 0.99
Mean observed elasticity 0.15
B. Taxable Income Elasticities
6. Bianchi, Gudmundsson, and Zoega (2001) Iceland 1987 Zero Tax Year 0.37 0.05 0.49 0.15 0.92 0.10 1.04
7. Gruber and Saez (2002) U.S. Tax Reforms 1979-1991 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.00 4.42 0.00 4.84
8. Saez (2004) U.S. Tax Reforms 1960-2000 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.00 3.51 0.00 3.64
9. Jacob and Ludwig (2008) Chicago Housing Voucher Lottery 0.12 0.03 0.36 0.02 0.84 0.01 0.92
10. Gelber (2010) Sweden, 1991 Tax Reform, Women 0.49 0.02 0.71 0.28 0.86 0.25 0.91
11. Gelber (2010) Sweden, 1991 Tax Reform, Men 0.25 0.02 0.71 0.12 0.54 0.10 0.59
12. Saez (2010) U.S., 1st EITC Kink, 1995-2004 0.00 0.02 0.34 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.77
13. Chetty et al. (2011a)  Denmark, Married Women, Top Kinks, 1994-2001 0.02 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.94
14. Chetty et al. (2011a)  Denmark, Middle Kinks, 1994-2001 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 6.62 0.00 6.62
15. Chetty et al. (2011a)  Denmark Tax Reforms, 1994-2001 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 9.88 0.00 9.89
Mean observed elasticity 0.15
C. Top Income Elasticities
16. Feldstein (1995) U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 1.04 0.26 0.37 2.89
17. Auten and Carroll (1999) U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 0.57 0.12 0.37 0.21 1.53 0.11 1.81
18. Goolsbee (1999) U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 1.00 0.15 0.37 0.47 2.14 0.32 2.47
19. Saez (2004) U.S. Tax Reforms 1960-2000 0.50 0.18 0.30 0.14 1.77 0.03 2.21
20. Kopczuk (2010) Poland, 2002 Tax Reform 1.07 0.22 0.30 0.44 2.58 0.24 3.09
Mean observed elasticity 0.84
D. Macro/Cross-Sectional
21. Prescott (2004) Cross-country Tax Variation, 1970-1996 0.46 0.09 0.42 0.18 1.20 0.10 1.41
22. Davis and Henrekson (2005) Cross-country Tax Variation, 1995 0.20 0.08 0.58 0.07 0.57 0.01 0.76
23. Blau and Kahn (2007) U.S. wage variation, 1980-2000 0.31 0.004 1.00 0.19 0.51 0.18 0.52
Mean observed elasticity 0.32
Unified Bounds Using Panels A and B: 0.28 0.54 0.23 0.61
Minimum- Estimate 0.33
Unified Bounds Using All Panels: 0.47 0.51 0.23 0.53
Minimum- Estimate 0.50
TABLE 1
Bounds on Intensive Margin Hicksian Labor Supply Elasticities with = 1% Frictions
95% CI
Note: This table shows bounds on structural intensive margin Hicksian elasticities using estimates from existing studies.  Column 3 shows the point estimate of the observed elasticity, column 4 
shows the associated standard error, and column 5 shows the size of the net-of-marginal-tax wage change used for identification.  Columns 6 and 7 show the lower and upper  bounds on the 
structural elasticity, calculated using Proposition A1.  Columns 8 and 9 give a 95% confidence interval for , constructed as in Imbens and Manski (2004).  See Appendix B for sources and details 
underlying calculations in columns 3-5.
−min:
−min:
    L L U UStudy Identification s.e.(  ) log(1-)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Quasi-Experimental Estimates
1. Eissa and Liebman (1996) U.S. EITC Expansions 1984-1990, Single Mothers 0.30 0.10 0.12 0.26 0.36 0.12 0.56
2. Graversen (1998) Denmark 1987 Tax Reform, Women 0.24 0.04 0.25 0.22 0.26 0.16 0.33
3. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) U.S. Welfare Reforms 1985-1997, Single Women 0.43 0.05 0.45 0.41 0.45 0.33 0.53
4. Devereux (2004) U.S. Wage Trends 1980-1990, Married Women 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.53
5. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) U.S. EITC expansions 1984-1996, Low-Income Married Men and Women  0.15 0.07 0.45 0.14 0.16 0.03 0.28
6. Liebman and Saez (2006) U.S. Tax Reforms 1991-1997, Women Married to High Income Men 0.15 0.30 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.72
7. Blundell, Bozio, and Laroque (2011) U.K. Tax Reforms 1978-2007, Prime-age Men and Women 0.30 n/a 0.74 0.29 0.31
Mean observed elasticity 0.25
B. Macro/Cross-Sectional
8. Nickell (2003) Cross-country Tax Variation, 1961-1992 0.14 n/a 0.54 0.13 0.15
9. Prescott (2004) Cross-country Tax Variation, 1970-1996 0.24 0.14 0.42 0.22 0.25 0.00 0.50
10. Davis and Henrekson (2005) Cross-country Tax Variation, 1995 0.13 0.11 0.58 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.33
11. Blau and Kahn (2007) U.S. Wage Variation 1989-2001, Married Women 0.45 0.004 1.00 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.46
Mean observed elasticity 0.24
Bounds on Extensive Margin Labor Supply Elasticities with  = 1% Frictions
Note: This table shows bounds on structural extensive margin  elasticities using estimates from existing studies.  Column 3 shows the point estimate of the observed elasticity, column 4 shows the associated standard error, 
and column 5 shows the size of the net-of-average-tax wage change used for identification.  Columns 6 and 7 show the lower and upper bounds on the structural elasticity, calculated using Proposition 2.  Columns 8 and 9 
give a 95% confidence interval for   , constructed as in Imbens and Manski (2004).  See Appendix C for sources and details underlying calculations in columns 3-5.
TABLE 2 
95% CI
  U L
  U LTABLE 3
Frisch Elasticities Implied by Hicksian Elasticity of 0.33
Income Effect: -d[wl*]/dY
0.00 0.11 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.55 0.66
0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
0.20 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.44
0.40 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.49 0.55
EIS 0.60 0.33 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.48 0.56 0.66
 () 0.80 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.44 0.53 0.64 0.77
1.00 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.58 0.71 0.88
1.20 0.33 0.35 0.41 0.50 0.63 0.79 0.99
1.40 0.33 0.35 0.42 0.53 0.67 0.87 1.10
Note: This table shows the intensive margin Frisch elastictity implied by various combinations of the EIS and 
income effect.  The calculations assume that the ratio of wealth to earned income is A/wl* = 1.26 (Dynan 2009) 
and the intensive margin Hicksian (compensated) elasticity is  = 1/3 (Table 1).  Values within the dashed lines 
are consistent with evidence that the EIS≤1 and the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is positive.  The 
values are computed using the equation 
F=+ρ(d[wl*]/dY)²(A/wl*).